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ASSISTED CONCEPTION AND EQUALITY 
OF FAMILIAL STATUS IN PARENTAGE 
LAW 
 
Wanda Wiegers  
 
Abstract: This article provides an in-depth analysis of 
outcomes in parentage disputes involving assisted conception 
across Canada. Throughout this article, I draw on equality of 
status, familial security and equity in terms of gender and 
sexual orientation as norms or values that should underlie and 
guide the legal regulation of parenthood in the context of 
reproductive technologies. Throughout, I also compare and 
contrast the sources of and the implications for children and 
parents of resistance in law towards the abolition of 




Parenthood has always been a complex and culturally variable 
legal construct. At common law, the husband of a mother of a 
child was presumed to be the father of that child. Rebuttable 
only by stringent proof that the husband could not possibly 
have fathered the child, this presumption in effect made 
marriage the most important marker of parental-child status at 
law. Outside of marriage, children born to unwed mothers had 
no legal relations and could not inherit status or property 
through their fathers. The implications of illegitimacy changed 
over time, first in relation to biological mothers and then 
fathers. The eradication of related disabilities marked a 
revolutionary step forward in parentage law but occurred in 
many parts of Canada only after a number of successful 
challenges under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms1. In 1990, the Minister of Justice in Saskatchewan 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
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described the abolition of illegitimacy as a reform that was 
“long overdue.”2 
 
Over the last few decades, technological change has 
presented new and different challenges in parentage law. While 
paternity testing has made genetic or biological parentage more 
easily ascertainable and less dependent on marital or other 
presumptions, the advent of reproductive technologies has 
fragmented parenthood into separate social and biological 
components.3  Some legislatures have again, however, been 
slow to grapple with the legal status of parties who use assisted 
conception. Only a few provinces, namely Alberta, Quebec, 
and most recently British Columbia, have a comprehensive 
legal framework in place to establish parentage and identify the 
relative rights and responsibilities of all the involved parties. In 
others, legislative action has been piecemeal or minimal. To the 
extent that reform has taken place in provinces such as 
Saskatchewan, it has been limited largely to the registration of 
births. This legislative lacuna exists despite the fact that a 
Uniform Child Status Act was formulated in 2010 and proposed 
for implementation across Canada.4 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
2  Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates, 
Committee of the Whole (12 June 1990), online: Legislative 
Assembly of Saskatchewan <http://docs.legassembly.sk.ca/legdocs/ 
Legislative%20Assembly/Hansard/21L4S/900612e.PDF> See also 
The Children’s Law Act, 1997, SS 1997, c C-8.2, s 40(3) [CLA, 
1997]. 
3  See Susan B Boyd, “Gendering Legal Parenthood: Bio-Genetic Ties, 
Intentionality and Responsibility” (2007) 25 Windsor YB Access Just 
63 [Boyd,“Gendering”]; Richard Collier & Sally Sheldon, 
Fragmenting Fatherhood: A Socio-Legal Study (Portland: Hart, 
2008). 
4  Civil Law Section of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, A 
Joint Project of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada and the 
Federal/Provincial/Territorial Coordinating Committee of Senior 
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There is obviously a lot at stake in establishing the 
parentage of children. Recognition of the status of a parent 
provides an opportunity for adults to experience and enjoy a 
long-lasting relationship with a child. These emotional 
connections to children are seen as ever more important to 
adults in a world marked increasingly by conjugal and 
economic insecurity. The financial implications of parental 
status are also significant, as parents can be liable for child 
support in excess of 18 years. For children, of course, their 
identity is largely shaped by their parentage, which determines 
their names, relationships, nationality, financial status, and 
lineage.5 Parentage, for both parents and children, establishes 
affective ties, economic and emotional well-being, and to a 
great extent, one’s life path and development. Many of the 
most meaningful rights, benefits and obligations flow through 
parentage. Uncertainty or conflict as to parental status at the 
outset of a child’s life has the potential to critically undermine 
these benefits by increasing stress and instability throughout 
the lives of both caregivers and children. 
 
Given the importance of familial security and equality 
of status to parents and children and its recognition in the 
context of illegitimacy, why do legislative gaps persist in the 
area of assisted conception in some jurisdictions? The novelty 
of reproductive technologies and uncertainty or ambivalence 
about the potential limits of technological intervention in the 
creation of human life may have initially stalled reform but can 
less adequately explain current inaction. As Marsha Garrison 
notes in the United States, many of these technologies are no 
longer novel and the legal issues emerging from their use are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Officials on Family Justice, “Uniform Child Status Act”, Halifax, 
Nova Scotia, August 22-26, 2010. 
5  British Columbia, Ministry of Attorney General, Justice Services 
Branch, Civil Policy and Legislation Office, White Paper on Family 
Relations Act Reform: Proposals for a new Family Law Act, 
(Victoria: Ministry of Justice, 2010) at 29. 
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fairly clear.6 As of 2012, there were at least 33 fertility clinics 
operating in Canada, assisting in thousands of pregnancies and 
births.7 Since 2002, usage rates appear to have increased as 
clinics have reported a greater number of cycles performed and 
higher pregnancy and birth rates.8 Garrison suggests that tens 
of thousands in the US have used or are using reproductive 
technologies9 and notes that most other developed nations have 
moved towards comprehensive reform.10  
 
Is the failure to provide certainty and stability within 
families that rely on assisted conception the mark of a new or 
continuing illegitimacy?11 Can it be said that these parents and 
children still face stigma and exclusion under the law, much 
like unmarried parents and their children did in many parts of 
Canada up to the 1990s? What can be learned from the 
successful struggle against illegitimacy that may assist in the 
struggle for reforms in the area of assisted conception? 
Notably, the status of illegitimacy was challenged at a time 
when increasing numbers of children were being born outside 
of marriage, many of them born to parents in common law 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6  Marsha Garrison, “Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive 
approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage” (2000) 113 
Harvard Law Review 837 at 852.  I use “assisted conception” in this 
article to denote gestational motherhood or surrogacy and the use of 
sperm and ova from single donors. 
7  Canadian Assisted Reproductive Technologies Register (CARTR), 
“2012 CARTR Results,” online: Canadian Fertility and Andrology 
Society <http://www.cfas.ca> at slide 2. 
8  Joanne Gunby et al, “Assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in 
Canada:  2007 results from the Canadian ART Register” (2011) 95:2 
Fertility and Sterility 542 at 546. 
9  Garrison, supra note 6 at 852, n 80. 
10  Ibid at 852-53. 
11  See text accompanying notes 44-46 below. 
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unions that were functionally similar to marital relationships. 
For many, the abolition of illegitimacy served to enhance the 
status of biological fathers by making it easier for mothers to 
seek support from them and easier for fathers to have 
continuing relationships with their biologically-related 
children. 12  By contrast, those seeking to use reproductive 
technologies include not only married and unmarried 
heterosexual couples who are experiencing infertility but also 
same sex couples and single men and women who want to 
parent alone. Relative to the struggles against illegitimacy, the 
potential diversity of family structures in the context of assisted 
reproduction poses a much greater challenge to dominant 
familial norms13 and to the intensification of privatized support 
since the 1990s.14 Arguably, it is precisely these value and 
policy choices that underlie and generate much of the stigma 
and negative stereotyping of families formed through assisted 
conception, particularly single mother families.  
In Part II of this article, I begin by identifying 
alternative values that from a relational perspective should 
propel legal reform in the area of assisted conception. As 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  Susan B Boyd et al, Autonomous Motherhood? A Socio-Legal Study 
of Choice and Constraint (forthcoming, 2014 Univ. of Toronto Press) 
ch 3 [Boyd et al, Autonomous Motherhood?]. 
13  See Alison Bird, “Legal Parenthood and the Recognition of 
Alternative Family Forms in Canada” (2009) 60 UNBLJ 264; Fiona 
Kelly, “Producing Paternity: The Role of Legal Fatherhood in 
Maintaining the Traditional Family,” (2009) 21 CJWL 315 [Kelly, 
“Producing Paternity”]; Fiona Kelly, “Equal Parents, Equal Children: 
Reforming Canada’s Parentage Laws to Recognize the Completeness 
of Women-led Families” (2013) 64 UNBLJ 253 [Kelly, “Equal 
Parents”]. 
14  Judy Fudge & Brenda Cossman, “Introduction: Privatization, Law, 
and the Challenge to Feminism” in Judy Fudge & Brenda Cossman, 
eds, Privatization, Law and the Challenge to Feminism (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002); Susan Boyd, Child Custody, Law 
and Women’s Work (Don Mills: Oxford, 2003). 
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recognized by the Ontario Court of Appeal in AA v BB,15 the 
deep value underlying the move towards abolition of 
illegitimacy was equality of familial status between children. I 
argue that this value, along with that of equality in terms of 
gender and sexual orientation, should be applied to families 
that are formed by way of assisted conception in order to 
provide all members with familial security and to avoid 
stereotyping and punishing parents and their children for 
deviation from dominant familial norms. In Part III, I provide a 
detailed summary of legal outcomes in the area of assisted 
conception and identify the specific gaps that exist in some 
jurisdictions. I illustrate how these gaps lead to irrational and 
untenable outcomes, particularly in Saskatchewan, and 
highlight how outcomes differ across jurisdictions. Although 
some parents may be able to rely on step-parent adoptions or 
standing as a step-parent to maintain a relationship with a child, 
the outcomes overall reflect a failure to promote the values of 
equality of status, familial security and non-discrimination on 
the grounds of gender and sexual orientation. In Part IV, I 
argue that reliance on the parens patriae jurisdiction of 
superior courts, as has occurred in Ontario, cannot adequately 
fill the legislative gap because it relies exclusively on a child-
centred norm and fails to promote in a consistent way the 
above-mentioned values. Although Charter challenges 
appeared to be significant in the elimination of discrimination 
against single mothers, fathers and children by reason of 
illegitimacy, I finally canvas the material differences and the 
potential pitfalls in relying on section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms to generate change in the area 




15  AA v BB, [2007] ONCA 2, leave to appeal refused Alliance for 
Marriage and Family v A(A), 2007 SCC 40, [2007] 3 SCR 124. 
16  Charter, supra note 1. 
Assisted Conception and Equality 153 
GUIDING VALUES OR NORMS 
 
Because parenthood connotes a relationship, a relational 
perspective will more adequately address the complex realities 
and the vital significance of the parent-child relationship to the 
lives of both parents and children.17 Unlike an individualistic 
perspective, a relational lens can more fully take account of the 
intense interdependence between parents and children and the 
multiple ways in which the well-being of one profoundly 
affects the other. As such, the values that guide parentage law 
in structuring the parent-child relationship should 
predominantly be those that can account for the interests of 
both parents and children without exclusively focusing on one 
or the other. Although parentage at one point in time conferred 
almost absolute authority over children, it is now readily 
acknowledged that children are not the property of parents but 
rather that parents owe duties and obligations towards them. 
Conversely, parentage in law has never been governed solely 
by the best interests of children but rather has largely been 
determined on the basis of biological maternity, marriage to the 
mother, and actual or presumed paternity. Thus, the law of 
parentage itself has reflected to some degree a convergence of 
the interests of both parents and children. 
 
In this section, I argue that three values or social norms 
should have a significant role in shaping the contours of 
parentage law in the context of assisted conception. I draw on a 
fundamental value underlying the abolition of illegitimacy, that 
of equality of status, in addition to a concern for familial 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17  See e.g. Susan B. Boyd, “Autonomy for Mothers?  Relational Theory 
and Parenting Apart” (2010) 18(2) Fem Legal Stud 127; Jennifer 
Nedelsky, Law’s Relations:  A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy 
and Law (Toronto:  Oxford University Press, 2012); Helen Rhoades, 
“Revising Australia’s Parenting Laws:  A Plea for a Relational 
Approach to Children’s Best Interests” (2010) 22 Child and Family 
Law Quarterly 172. 
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security and equality in terms of gender and sexual orientation. 
These values are not exhaustive of all relevant values, nor 
necessarily determinative of all outcomes.18 As well, there are 
interpretative contests as to what these values mean and will 
entail in their application to concrete fact situations. There is, 
in my view, no “bright-line test” that will generate easy 
resolutions given the diverse range of circumstances and 
technologies available.19 Arguably, however, the interpretations 
I defend have the potential to point toward determinate 
outcomes that are already reflected in legislation such as the 
recent Family Law Act in British Columbia20 and to a large 
extent, the proposed Uniform Child Status Act21.  
 
Since the abolition of illegitimacy, most parentage 
provisions now begin with a declaration that a person is the 
child of his or her parents and his or her status as their child is 
independent of whether he or she is born within or outside 
marriage.22 In AA v BB, the Ontario Court of Appeal identified 
equality of child status as the fundamental norm or objective 
underlying the abolition of illegitimacy.23 Rosenberg JA stated: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18  See e.g. Lori Chambers, “Newborn Adoption: Birth Mothers, Genetic 
Fathers and Reproductive Autonomy” (2010) 26 Can J Fam L 339 
(other values could be identified, such as reproductive autonomy); 
Katharine T Bartlett, “Re-Expressing Parenthood” (1988) 98 Yale LJ 
293 (emphasis on responsible parenthood). I choose not to rely on 
notions of responsibility since they are heavily inflected with the 
individualism so dominant in neo-liberalism, see e.g. Linda C 
McClain, “‘Irresponsible’ Reproduction” (1996) 47 Hastings LJ 339. 
19  But see Garrison, supra note 6 (who argues in favor of such a test at 
868). 
20  Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25 [BC FLA]. 
21  Supra note 4. 
22  See e.g. CLA, 1997, supra note 2, s 40; Children’s Law Reform Act, 
RSO 1990, c C.12, s 1(1) [Ontario CLRA]. 
23  Supra note 15 at paras 20, 35. 
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The purpose of the legislation was to declare 
that all children should have equal status. At the 
time, equality of status meant recognizing the 
equality of children born inside and outside of 
marriage. The Legislature had in mind 
traditional unions between one mother and one 
father. It did not legislate in relation to other 
types of relationships because those 
relationships and the advent of reproductive 
technology were beyond the vision of the Law 
Reform Commission and the Legislature of the 
day.24 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal recognized that the same 
underlying principle, i.e. that all children should have “equal 
status in law” regardless of their families of origin or the 
conditions of their birth, should apply in the context of assisted 
conception. “There is nothing in the legislative history of the 
CLRA to suggest that the Legislature made a deliberate policy 
choice to exclude the children of lesbian mothers from the 
advantages of equality of status accorded to other children 
under the Act.”25 Lack of recognition meant that “children of 
these relationships are deprived of the equality of status that 
declarations of parentage provide.”26 In the result, relying on 
the Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction, both the biological 
mother and the social mother were declared mothers in addition 
to the biological father. The recognition of three parents, 
including two mothers, was presented as a function of 
children’s equal status. 
 
The meaning and parameters of ‘equal status’ in this 
context are contestable but the vision of equality relied on by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24  Ibid at para 34. 
25  Ibid at para 38. 
26  Ibid at para 35. 
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the Court in AA v BB is not that of formal equality and its 
implications extend beyond the status of the child. Obviously, 
there are differences in the birth circumstances of children born 
to biological parents outside of marriage and children 
conceived through the use of assisted reproduction. In the 
particular case of AA v BB, there were two mothers, one of 
whom was a social mother, as well as a biological father. 
Notwithstanding these differences, the Court postulates that the 
families of the children in both situations should be supported 
and recognized as legally valid. In both, the family forms at 
issue were identified as departures from traditional norms. 
Interpreted contextually, against the backdrop of historically 
dominant social norms, equality of familial status challenges 
not only the marital form of family but also the biological, 
heterosexual dyad as the preferred site for the rearing of 
children.  Non-biological heterosexual families contradict the 
assumed ‘naturalness’ of this ideal dyad, as evident in efforts 
throughout most of the twentieth century to seal adoption 
records, falsely amend birth certificates and mimic in other 
ways the biological family.27  However, same sex and single 
parent families currently pose the greatest challenges to 
dominant familial norms and both have been the object of 
historical and continuing discrimination.  
 
Historically, in the context of illegitimacy, both legal 
and religious norms contributed to the suffering and 
stigmatization of the ‘fallen woman’ and her child. However, 
unmarried women and children who depended on public 
provision through the parish relief system in England from the 
late sixteenth century onward suffered most, by way of 
confinement in the workhouse, the exploitation of child labour 
in apprenticeships and factories, and the whipping or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27  See Naomi R Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger, eds, Families by Law:  
An Adoption Reader (New York:  New York University Press, 2004);  
Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds:  Adoption and the Politics of 
Parenting (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 1993) at 164-86. 
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imprisonment of mothers themselves up to 1816.28 The New 
Poor law of 1834 maintained this punitive orientation towards 
mothers: they were separated from their children upon birth, 
made primarily liable for support of their children but not 
allowed to directly obtain support from fathers (payments were 
made to the parish) and, like rape victims at common law, their 
testimony against putative fathers required corroboration 
before it could be believed.29 In Canada, unmarried mothers 
who could claim public relief were not generally subject to the 
same range and severity of punishments but their claims for 
support in the twentieth century were subject to some of the 
same limitations, including the need for corroboration, and in 
many jurisdictions, payment could only be made to the state 
and not the mother directly. Until the abolition of illegitimacy 
in the late twentieth century, Susan B. Boyd and Lori 
Chambers document the same tendency for state agencies and 
lawmakers to view unmarried mothers as untrustworthy and 
degenerate, especially those who had never cohabited with 
fathers.30 The animus behind these policies was not only a 
concern with protecting men from mendacious women but also 
a desire to discourage and inhibit single women from bearing 
children and relying on state support.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28  Jenny Teichman, Illegitimacy: An Examination of Bastardy (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1982) at 62-3 (in 1760, 80% of the infants 
born in or placed in the workhouse died before the age of 12 months). 
29  Ibid at 65. 
30  In Ontario, only 6.7% of mothers who had never cohabited with the 
alleged fathers were successful in obtaining agreements or child 
support orders between 1921 and 1969, compared to 87.9% of 
mothers who had cohabited with fathers. Lori Chambers, 
Misconceptions: Unmarried Motherhood and the Ontario Children of 
Unmarried Parents Act, 1921-1969 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2007) at 150; Boyd et al, Autonomous Motherhood?, supra 
note 12. 
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It is significant that most of the shame and ignominy of 
illegitimacy was heaped upon mothers and their children.31 
Although biological fathers lacked legal status and were 
commonly assumed to lack interest in their progeny, mothers 
were considered primarily responsible for pre- or extra-marital 
sexual conduct and its consequences. 32  The “prototypical 
illegitimate social identity” was the “mother of the illegitimate 
child.”33 Well into the twentieth century, unmarried mothers 
were considered sexually immoral or psychologically troubled, 
and their children were considered at risk and better off if 
placed for adoption outside of their mothers’ care. 34 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31  See e.g. Peter Ward, “Unwed motherhood in nineteenth-century 
English Canada” (1981) 16 Historical Papers 34; Constance B. 
Backhouse, “Desperate Women and Compassionate Courts:  
Infanticide in Nineteenth Century Canada” (1984) 34 Univ of Toronto 
Law Jnl 447 at 448; Andree Levesque, “Deviants Anonymous:  
Single Mothers at the Hopital de la Misericorde in Montreal, 1929-
1939” in Katherine Arnup, Andree Levesque & Ruth Roach Pierson, 
eds, Delivering Motherhood:  Maternal Ideologies and Practices in 
the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York:  Routledge, 1990) 108; 
Margaret Jane Hillyard Little, ‘No Car, No Radio, No Liquor Permit’  
The Moral Regulation of Single Mothers in Ontario 1920 – 1997 
(Toronto:  Oxford University Press, 1998) at 12, 135-36 (mothers of 
illegitimate children were denied Mother’s allowance or subjected to 
more onerous conditions of eligibility up to 1966 in Ontario). 
32  Lorenne MG Clark & Debra J Lewis, Rape: The Price of Coercive 
Sexuality (Toronto:  The Women’s Press, 1977) at 155-56 (a double 
standard of sexual morality also played out in rape law); Rickie 
Solinger, Wake Up Little Susie: Single Pregnancy and Race Before 
Roe v. Wade (New York: Routledge, 1992) (according to Rickie 
Solinger, in post-war United States, “[t]he girl or woman who ‘got 
herself pregnant’ was the locus of blame, the target of treatment 
programs and punishments” at 36). 
33  Gail Reekie, Measuring Immorality:  Social Inquiry & the Problem of 
Illegitimacy (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 181. 
34  Veronica Strong-Boag, Finding Families, Finding Ourselves: English 
Canada Encounters Adoption from the Nineteenth Century to the 
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Illegitimacy, as such, had consequences beyond the legal 
exclusion of fathers. From the perspective of the unmarried 
mother and child, illegitimacy was a disciplinary practice 
aimed at preserving the primacy of legal marriage and limiting 
the reliance of single mothers upon state support.35 
 
Reforms of the last two to three decades have 
substantially changed the legal impact of parentage outside of 
marriage for mothers and their children, and for fathers. 
Statutes limiting rights to support through requirements such as 
corroboration were finally struck down as contrary to the 
Charter in the late 1980s.36 Ontario was the first jurisdiction to 
abolish the status of illegitimacy in 1977, with most others 
following suit up to 1990.37 Nova Scotia has abolished most of 
the disabilities associated with illegitimacy but still allows for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1990s (Toronto: OUP, 2006); Regina G. Kunzel, Fallen Women, 
Problem Girls:  Unmarried Mothers and the Professionalization of 
Social Work (New Haven, 1993:  Yale University Press) at 144-170; 
Solinger, supra note 32 (found that the US government and private 
agencies generally perceived white unwed mothers as mentally ill and 
black unwed mothers as sexually immoral). 
35  Chambers, supra note 30 at 14-32; Derek Gill, Illegitimacy, Sexuality 
and the Status of Women (Oxford:  Basil Blackwell, 1977) 308; Little, 
supra note 31 at 128. 
36  See infra, note 248. 
37  See e.g. Children’s Law Reform Act, SO 1977, c 41, ss 1-2; Law and 
Equity Act, RSBC 1979, c 224, s 56; Charter of Rights Amendments 
Act 1985 SBC 1985, c. 68; The Children’s Law Act, SS 1990-91, c C-
8.1, ss 40-42; An Act to Amend the Family Maintenance Act, SM 
1982-83-84, c 54, s 24; Child and Family Services and Family 
Relations Act SNB 1980, c C-2.1, s 96(1); The Children’s Law Act 
SN 1988, c 61, s 89(1), Child Status Act SPEI 1987, c 8, s 1(1). 
Alberta, however, did not repeal its separate Parentage and 
Maintenance Act until 2003 (Family Law Act SA 2003, c F-4.5) and 
only repealed its Legitimation Act in 2011 (Family Law Statutes 
Amendment Act, 2010 SA 2010, c 16, s 1). 
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the legitimation of children through marriage subsequent to 
birth.38 These changes overall reflected a growing consensus 
that it was morally indefensible to hold children responsible for 
parental ‘misdeeds’ and on that basis relegate them to an 
inferior status in relation to other children.39 Abolition helped 
reduce the stigma of illegitimacy for children and their mothers 
while simultaneously responding to claims that unwed fathers 
should have equal parental rights. These developments were 
consistent with improved paternity testing, a declining birth 
rate, a growing acceptance of common law relationships, and 
an increasing emphasis on fatherhood in family law. As 
importantly, these developments aligned with a neoliberal trend 
favouring the privatization of dependency over the 1980s and 
90s through an expansion of individual support obligations.40 
 
While reforms related to illegitimacy ultimately 
brought biological dads in and increased the range and amount 
of child support, assisted conception, by contrast, has the 
potential to leave some biological dads out, depending on the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38  Maintenance and Custody Act, RSNS 1989, c 160, ss 49-50. 
39  Boyd et al, Autonomous Motherhood?, supra note 12. 
40  Fudge & Cossman, supra note 14. Neo-liberalism describes a 
restructuring process or policy orientation underway since at least the 
mid-1970s that has promoted greater reliance on private (rather than 
public) sources of economic support such as market income, family 
supports and the voluntary sector, see Wanda Wiegers, “Child-
Centred Advocacy and the Invisibility of Women in Poverty 
Discourse and Social Policy” in Dorothy E Chunn, Susan B. Boyd & 
Hester Lessard, eds, Reaction and Resistance:  Feminism, Law and 
Social Change (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 229 at 235-46. The 
expansion of private support obligations has included extended 
support for adult children and an enlarged role for step-parents 
through provincial legislation along with passage of the federal Child 
Support Guidelines (CSG) and more rigorous enforcement measures.  
Under the CSG, biological fathers are primarily liable for child 
support.   
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configuration of the family. In AA v BB, the Court increased the 
number of parents to three by recognizing the social mother but 
the applicants pursued this option because they wanted to 
maintain the parental status of the biological father.41 This 
outcome was, strictly speaking, a departure from a dominant 
two-parent heterosexual familial model but one which may 
have been viewed as palatable to the Court because it retained 
parental ties to the biological parents and expanded the sources 
of emotional and financial support for the child while not 
exposing him to instability or parental conflict. The Court did 
not have to contend with a motion by two lesbian mothers or a 
single mother to relinquish the parental status of a sperm donor.  
 
Both same sex and single parenthood mark a radical 
departure from heterosexual reproduction and the “idea that 
there are natural sexual differences in parenting behavior.”42 
Single parenthood also reduces the private sources of financial 
support for a child to less than two.43 Here again, however, a 
refusal to recognize the validity of such families perpetuates 
stigma for children and their caregivers as a result of family 
structure, the number of parents or the circumstances of birth. 
It assumes that these families invariably provide inadequate 
settings for the rearing of children. Exclusion by law can 
thereby continue to play a substantial role in stigmatizing a 
father’s absence, not by virtue of a refusal to recognize some 
fathers, but rather, by a refusal to equally recognize children 
and families without fathers. This failure to fully recognize 
fatherless families is functionally similar to the disabilities and 
stigma formerly targeted at unwed mothers and children under 
the old illegitimacy laws. 44  As Gail Reekie suggests, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41  Supra note 15. 
42  Reekie, supra note 33 at 182. 
43  Kelly, “Producing Paternity,” supra note 13 at 329. 
44  The comparison I am making here with illegitimacy should be 
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illegitimacy functions culturally “as a metaphor for socially 
undesirable reproduction”45 and “covertly as support for its 
binary opposite – legitimacy”, a principle which has defined 
normative parenthood as having a father.46 
 
Marsha Garrison, however, has argued that equal status 
for children means that similar rules should govern cases 
involving both sexual and assisted conception.47 She uses an 
“interpretative approach” to identify two dominant themes in 
American parentage law in the context of sexual conception 
and adoption: “children’s interests come first and two-parent 
care is generally preferable to that of one parent alone.”48 In 
other words, Garrison starts from a potentially discriminatory 
premise to generate outcomes that are consistent with a two-
parent, preferably marital outcome. Her analysis depends 
vitally on the assumption that two parents are a socially 
preferred family form and one that the law can legitimately 
encourage and support irrespective of individual 
circumstances. 49  Equally important is the assumption that 
differences between sexual and technological conception are or 
should be wholly irrelevant to parentage law. She argues that 
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distinguished from that of US authors who define the “new 
illegitimacy” as a refusal to recognize more than one parent, 
presumably to the child’s detriment, see e.g. Susan Frelich Appleton, 
“Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New” (2012) 20 Am U J Gender Soc 
Pol’y & L 347 at 371.  This usage relies predominantly on the 
father’s experience of illegitimacy as the reference point or norm for 
comparison. 
45  Reekie, supra note 33 at 178. 
46  Ibid at 181; see Kelly, “Producing Paternity,” supra note 13. 
47  Supra note 6. 
48  Ibid at 895. 
49  See below, Part V for discussion of the impact of section 15 of the 
Charter.  
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the circumstances surrounding a child’s birth or the “mechanics 
of conception” are not relevant to the “relational interests that 
ultimately result.”50 As such, the legal standards governing 
heterosexual intercourse and assisted conception should be the 
same and children born through either process should have 
identical rights.  
 
A number of consequences follow from Garrison’s 
focus on the interests of children in isolation from those of 
parents, her reliance on a formal conception of equality, and 
her use of heterosexual procreation as the norm for the 
evaluation of alternative family forms. Since biological fathers 
are invariably held responsible for child support (regardless of 
representations regarding birth control, etc.)51 and can claim 
custody and access as a result of sexual conception, she argues 
that the same rights should be available to children born 
through assisted conception. More specifically, since children 
conceived in the ordinary course of conception have two 
parents, a mother and father, so should children conceived 
through assisted conception regardless of the arrangements 
made between the relevant parties. In Garrison’s perspective, 
lesbian and single-mother households are both problematic 
because they deny a child a paternal relationship and in the 
latter case, a second legal parent.52 Susan Frelich Appleton in 
fact identifies a new “subset of ‘illegitimate’ children” as those 
children born of assisted conception who have no legally 
recognized father. 53  Both scholars appear to assume that 
children are inevitably disadvantaged by this treatment.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50  Garrison, supra note 6 at 882. 
51  See e.g. Buschow v Jors [1994] SJ No 136, 118 Sask R 306 (QB). 
52  Garrison, supra note 6 at 903. 
53  Supra note 44 at 371, 384. 
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However, contrary to the assumption that a child needs 
an ongoing relationship with a father or father figure in order to 
thrive, empirical evidence suggests that children in female-led 
two parent families fare as well, if not better, than children in 
heterosexual two-parent households.54 Studies also suggest that 
the absence of a genetic relationship with a caregiver does not 
in itself inhibit healthy child development.55 Empirical studies 
do indicate that children in single parent households differ on 
average in terms of educational achievement, emotional health, 
and future occupational status.56 However, these correlations 
may be largely, if not entirely, explained by lower levels of 
financial support, conflict that pre-dated separation or 
continues during or after separation, and inadequate social 
supports.57 Because most studies conflate divorced, separated, 
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54  Timothy J Biblarz & Judith Stacey, “How does the Gender of Parents 
Matter?” (2010) 72 Journal of Marriage and Family 3 at 13. 
55  See e.g. Susan Golombok et al, “Social vs. Biological Parenting: 
Family Functioning and the Socio-Emotional Development of 
Children Conceived by Egg or Sperm Donation” (1999) 40 Journal of 
Child Psychology and Psychiatry 519 at 525; Ava D Agar, Jan DD 
Cioe & Boris B Gorzalka, “Biology Matters? Intimate Relationships 
of Young Adults from Divorced and Intact Family Background as a 
Function of Biological Father and Male Model Involvement” (2010) 
51 International Journal of Divorce and Remarriage 441. 
56  See e.g. Anne-Marie Ambert, One Parent Families: Characteristics, 
Causes, Consequences and Issues (Ottawa: Vanier Institute, 2006) at 
15-16; Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara McLanahan, “Father Absence 
and Child Well-Being:  A Critical Review” in Daniel P Moynihan, 
Timothy M Smeeding, & Lee Rainwater eds, The Future of the 
Family (New York:  Russell Sage Foundation, 2004) 116 (in a review 
of numerous American studies find that children in one-parent 
families experience lower rates of academic achievement, a higher 
incidence of behavioral problems, earlier home leaving and child-
bearing, poorer physical and psychological health and lower adult 
income and occupational status on average than children in two-
parent homes, at 120-126).   
57  Ambert, ibid at 16. Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, ibid, indicate that 
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or cohabiting households with never-married or never-
cohabiting ones, some of these underlying factors would also 
arguably not come into play to the same extent in relation to 
single parents relying on assisted conception. The latter are not 
undergoing transitions or dissolution and their pregnancies are 
not unexpected; as such, they are likely to be relatively more 
stable than many of the households used to generate the 
average differentials.58  
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income loss and economic insecurity upon separation explains at least 
half, possibly more, of the differential.  When underlying differences 
in well-being prior to, during or after separation (e.g. by reason of 
inter-parental conflict) are taken into account, differences then 
become “smaller, sometimes statistically insignificant,” at 127-28.  
Evidence is mixed as to the impact of reduced ability to supervise and 
monitor children and outcomes may depend on the kind of 
relationship – whether close and authoritative – developed with a 
second parent. The emotional or psychological impact of family 
dissolution upon a custodial parent’s ability to provide “emotional 
support and moderate, consistent control” is consistently supported as 
a variable generating adverse effects, at 136. See Don Kerr & Roderic 
Beaujot, “Family Relations, Low Income and Child Outcomes:  A 
Comparison of Canadian Children in Intact, Step and Lone Parent 
Families” (2004) 43 International Journal of Comparative Sociology 
134 (identifying factors such as family functioning, number of 
children, education and age of parents as relevant to child outcomes 
in addition to low income); Lee Caragata & Sara J Cumming, “Lone 
Mother-led Families: Exemplifying the Structure of Social 
Inequality” (2011) 5:5 Sociology Compass 376 (suggesting income, 
housing tenure and maternal education may fully explain the 
association between lone motherhood and negative child outcomes). 
58  See e.g. Jennifer Lansford, Antonia Abbey, & Abigail Stewart, “Does 
Family Structure Matter?  A Comparison of Adoptive, Two-Parent 
Biological, Single-Mother, Stepfather, and Stepmother Households” 
(2001) 63:3 Journal of Marriage and Family 840 (suggest that family 
processes are more important than family structure) and Susan 
Golombok and Shirlene Badger, “Children raised in mother-headed 
families from infancy:  a follow-up of children of lesbian and single 
heterosexual mothers, at early adulthood” (2010) 25:1 Human 
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In any case, notwithstanding differences in risk 
between two-parent and single parent households on average, 
“the clear majority [of children in all lone-parent households] 
grow up healthy” and their outcomes are no different than 
those of children in two-parent households.59 Many also have 
adequate financial incomes and extended familial support and 
many would no doubt fare better if more socialized supports 
were available.60 Moreover, as indicated by divorce statistics, 
there is no guarantee that two heterosexual parents at the outset 
of a child’s life will comprise or remain a stable, harmonious 
family unit.61 Indeed, children in intact but highly conflicted 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Reproduction 150 (children functioning well, with lower levels of 
anxiety and higher levels of self-esteem than the comparison group of 
children in traditional two-parent families: “This finding is in direct 
contrast to the more negative psychological outcomes associated with 
single-mother families following separation or divorce, and highlights 
the diversity among female-headed families and the importance of not 
treating them as the same” at 56); Elizabeth Nixon, Sheila Greene and 
Diane Hogan, “”It’s What’s Normal for Me”:  Children’s Experiences 
of Growing Up in a Continuously Single-Parent Household” (2013) 
XX(X) Journal of Family Issues 1 at 8.  
59  David P. Ross, Paul A. Roberts & Katherine Scott, “How Do Lone-
Parent Children Differ from All Children” (Ottawa: Applied Research 
Branch, 1998). 
60  See Lee Rainwater & Timothy M Smeeding, “Single-Parent Poverty, 
Inequality, and the Welfare State” in Moynihan, Smeeding, & 
Rainwater, supra note 56 [Rainwater & Smeeding] (a cross-national 
comparison of income support policies that improve the economic 
well-being of children in single parent families); Nancy E. Dowd In 
the Defence of Single-Parent Families (New York:  New York 
University Press, 1999) (argues that single parent families are blamed 
for structural failures in US family law, the workplace and social 
policy). 
61  According to the 2011 General Social Survey (a voluntary 
population-based survey) 38% of divorced or separated parents, or 
1.2 million Canadians, had a child together when they separated or 
divorced. Marire Sinha, Parenting and Child Support After 
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two-parent homes often fare worse than children in divorced 
families.62 The well-being of children thus depends on many 
interrelated factors that vary according to the individual 
circumstances of each household.  
 
Ironically, while seeking to achieve equal status for 
children, Garrison chooses a norm that would not only deprive 
the child in AA v BB of more than two parents but would highly 
stigmatize children in lesbian and single parent families. The 
number of children raised in single parent households in 
particular is not insubstantial. According to the 2011 Census of 
Population in Canada, the number of lone-parent families 
increased 8 percent between 2006 and 2011 and represented 
16.3 percent (1,527,840) of all families, with 19.3 percent of all 
children living with lone parents and 8 out of 10 of these 
families being headed by women.63 These families include not 
only separated or divorced households in which contact is 
maintained with each parent but also families in which a single 
parent has adopted or where fathers are unknown, a parent has 
died or abandoned his or her children, or where access is 
contrary to the children’s best interests.64 With one in five 
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Separation or Divorce (Ottawa:  Statistics Canada, 2014) at 5.   
62  Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, supra note 56 at 127, 140; Donna 
Ruane Morrison & Mary Jo Coro, “Parental Conflict and Marital 
Disruption:  Do Children Benefit when High Conflict Marriages are 
Dissolved?” (1999) 61(3) Journal of Marriage and Family 626; 
Martha Shaffer, “Joint Custody, Parental Conflict and Children’s 
Adjustment to Divorce: What the Social Science Literature Does and 
Does Not Tell Us” (2007) 26 Can Fam LQ 285 at 289-90. 
63  Statistics Canada, 2011 Census of Population, online: 
<http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/as-sa/98-312-
x/98-312-x2011001-eng.cfm> [accessed July 3, 2013]. 
64  Cathryne L Schmitz, “Reframing the Dialogue on Female-Headed 
Single-Parent Families” (1995) 10 Affilia 426 at 437-38. Schmitz 
argues that “single-parent families are not the homogeneous group 
they are commonly portrayed to be” and that “the diversity of family 
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children being raised in a lone parent household, these families 
should not be stereotyped and socially stigmatized as inferior. 
Parents and children in these families should not be presumed 
to be defective simply due to the composition of their 
household.  
 
The concern that single parents have fewer sources of 
financial support is, unfortunately, reflective of a political 
climate in which governments are choosing to diminish public 
resources for families and parents are forced to be increasingly 
reliant on private sources. Policies that promoted greater social 
responsibility for children, such as those adopted in northern 
European nations, would help to allay these concerns.65 Even in 
the absence of such policies, however, there is evidence that 
parents who use assisted conception typically engage in a high 
level of planning and advance deliberation and many have 
made careful financial provision for their families in advance 
of conception.66 Where households do face a higher risk of 
reliance on social assistance, lessons from the illegitimacy 
context suggest that single mothers and their children as a 
group should not be punished for not having engaged fathers or 
for reliance on social provision.  
 
Equality of familial status is linked to the value of 
familial security, which is important to parents and children 
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styles by race, ethnicity, economic condition, and actual 
circumstances is frequently unknown or ignored.” 
65  See Rainwater & Smeeding, supra note 60 at 97-98.  The percentage 
of children who lived in single-mother families in the 1990s in the US 
and UK was higher than the percentage in Sweden, Denmark, Finland 
and Norway.  However, the latter countries had substantially lower 
single-mother child poverty rates both as a result of higher wages and 
higher levels of social support. 
66  Proceed with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Government 
Services Canada, 1993) at 471-72.  
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and society more generally. Familial security can be promoted 
by a vast range of initiatives, including the provision of 
socialized supports. Knowledge of one’s parental identity and 
genealogical history at a certain age through the use of known 
or identity-release donors may also enhance a child’s sense of 
familial security.67 At its most basic level, however, familial 
security requires consistency and predictability in the 
regulation of parental rights and responsibilities. Uncertainty as 
to parental roles is a threat to the stability of these families, 
particularly in the case of mothers who lack a biological tie to a 
child as well as access to presumptions of parentage but also in 
the case of single parents who have planned to parent alone. 
Several writers have documented, for example, the fears held 
by lesbian mothers of excessive interference with their 
parenting and the sense that their families are vulnerable to 
attack and intrusion that will be destabilizing to their and their 
child’s understanding of family. According to Fiona Kelly’s 
findings, if the law protected lesbian mothers from these 
effects, or “gave them more security, lesbian mothers might be 
more open to [some level of] donor involvement,” which may 
well benefit children.68 
 
My argument here should not be confused with a claim 
that relies simply on contractual rights as the basis for the 
resolution of issues surrounding assisted conception. Garrison 
contends that scholars who rely on intentionality and the 
reliance interests of the intended parents must demonstrate 
“why intention and reliance should count for so much more 
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67  See Angela Cameron, Vanessa Gruben & Fiona Kelly, “De-
Anonymizing Sperm Donors in Canada: Some Doubts and 
Directions” (2010) 26 Can J Fam L 95 at 109-110. 
68  “(Re)forming Parenthood: The Assignment of Legal Parentage 
Within Planned Lesbian Families” (2009) 40 Ottawa L Rev 185 at 
208. See Fiona Kelly, Transforming Law’s Family:  The Legal 
Recognition of Planned Lesbian Motherhood (Vancouver, UBC 
Press, 2011). 
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here than they do elsewhere in the law of parentage, or how an 
approach focused on adult intentions can be reconciled with 
children’s interests.”69 It is well established that agreements 
generally are not binding on courts insofar as they relate to 
children. As seen in the adoption context, parentage is not 
simply the product of the adoptive and biological parents’ 
intentions. Although biological parentage can be relinquished 
by consent or agreement, the extensive degree of regulation 
and monitoring (the need for consent of biological parents after 
birth, the prohibition of consideration and advertisements, and 
the need for a home study and formal court order) reflect a 
refusal to treat a child simply as an object of exchange. 
Similarly, the intentions underlying the use of assisted 
conception should not be given effect simply because they are 
the product of an agreement. It is nonetheless important to 
recognize that the conduct of the parties prior to a child’s birth 
can generate reliance that is instrumental in establishing 
particular family structures for the child. The reliance interests 
in this context, as they affect the lives and long-term 
responsibilities of intended parents in fundamental ways, are 
far weightier than those that arise in the vast majority of 
commercial contexts or for that matter, many other familial 
contexts.  
 
Moreover, as indicated, parentage defines a 
relationship between a parent and child and should not be 
identified by a perception of children’s interests in isolation 
from those of their parents. The expectation and reliance 
interests of intending parents are in fact relevant to children’s 
best interests because they directly affect their experience of 
familial stability. The failure to respect agreements that are 
responsibly made and deliberately planned greatly increases the 
risk of conflict in families created by assisted conception. It is 
well established empirically that conflict between parents and 
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69  Garrison, supra note 6 at 862-63. See also Appleton, supra note 44 at 
373. 
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added stress in their lives is generally harmful for children.70 It 
interrupts nurturance and undermines the quality of primary 
care, especially when disputes enter the legal arena. Rules that 
can provide guidelines for the secure recognition of parentage 
at and from a child’s birth and the avoidance of ongoing 
conflict in their lives will generally be in the interests of both 
caregivers and children.  
 
Finally, equality in terms of gender and sexual 
orientation is an important value that must be taken into 
account. Recognition of intending parentage that is limited to 
male heterosexuals constitutes a denial of gender equity as well 
as discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. 71 
Singling out sole parenthood as problematic also has gender 
implications because more women are single parents than 
men.72 Thus, mothers and their children will be more adversely 
affected by negative stereotypes attaching to the status of single 
parenthood. Mothers, moreover, have by nature a more 
extensive role in the reproductive process than do men. 
Garrison’s formal equality approach to the regulation of 
parenthood leads her to the counterintuitive outcome that 
sperm donors should be recognized (except, it seems, in the 
case of heterosexual intending parents) but gestational mothers 
should not.73  A failure to recognize the salient differences 
between different modes of conception and the differential 
involvement and interests of affected parties fails to take 
account of both gender equity and significant differences in the 
relational ties of mothers and fathers with their children. Since 
women’s experience of procreation differs from that of men, 
outcomes should not be determined simply through the 
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70  Shaffer, supra note 62. 
71  See text accompanying notes 224-227, 239, 254-265, below. 
72  See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
73  See text accompanying notes 159-187, below. 
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application of a male norm.74 Gender neutrality in this sense 
amounts to a denial of gender equity and is analogous to the 
long discredited view that discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy did not constitute sex discrimination, simply 
because men did not experience it.75 By treating the manner of 
conception and circumstances of birth as totally irrelevant to 
the outcome, Garrison’s analysis not only fails to provide 
mothers with gender equity but may also not fully realize 
children’s best interests. 
 
In the next section, I argue that existing parentage law 
in many Canadian jurisdictions is designed around sexual 
conception and leads to inappropriate outcomes in its 
application to technological conception. It both fails to reflect 
and promote the above values and generates irrational and 
untenable outcomes for children and their caregivers. 
 
EXISTING STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND 
UNTENABLE OUTCOMES 
 
Multiple Parents and a Heterosexist Lens 
 
Defining parentage in terms of one mother and one father 
reflects conventional heterosexual procreation. It both limits 
parents to two and defines them biologically according to 
gender. In the reproductive context, however, parenthood is 
potentially fragmented between gamete donors, gestational 
mothers, and intending parents, who may be heterosexual or 
same sex. These variations have only been partially recognized 
in parentage law; there are both inconsistent provisions across 
statutes and between jurisdictions.  
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74  See generally Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, 
Exclusion and American Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1990). 
75  See cases cited infra, note 264. 
Assisted Conception and Equality 173 
Birth registration statutes have recognized the 
possibility of multiple parents and the standing of intending 
parents to a greater extent than legislation establishing 
parentage. Over the last decade,76 vital statistics legislation in 
Saskatchewan and elsewhere was amended to provide for the 
registration of an intended or an “other parent.”77 This parent is 
defined in the Saskatchewan Vital Statistics Act as a person 
“cohabiting with the mother or father of the child in a spousal 
relationship at the time of the child’s birth and who intends to 
participate as a parent in the upbringing of the child.”78 In the 
absence of a contest, registration is presumed to reflect the 
truth of parentage and ordinarily provides the status to meet 
most of the practical functions associated with parenthood such 
as school registration and hospital care.  
 
However, problems arise in some provinces if and 
when parentage is challenged under statutes that allow for the 
amendment of the particulars of registration in accordance with 
declarations of parentage.79 A judicial declaration of parentage, 
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76  In some jurisdictions, reform followed the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Trociuk v British Columbia, 2003 SCC 34, [2003] 1 SCR 
835. See also MDR v Ontario (2006) 81 OR (3d) 81, 270 DLR (4th) 
90; OJ No 2268 (Sup Ct);  Gill v Murray [2001] BCHRTD No 34. 
77  See e.g. The Vital Statistics Act, 2009 SS 2009, c V-7.21, s 2(1). See 
also The Vital Statistics Act CCSM, c V-60, ss 3(6), 3(6.2), 32(5); 
Civil Code of Quebec, LRQ c-C-1991, art 115; Vital Statistics Act, 
RSBC 1996, c 479, s 3(1.1); Birth Registration Regulations made 
under s 51 of the Vital Statistics Act, RSNS 1989, c 494, s 3(1), NS 
Reg 390/2007; Vital Statistics Act, 2009, SNL 2009, c V-6.01, s 5(5); 
Consolidation of Vital Statistics Act RSNWT 1988 c. V-3, s. 1, 
2(2.1); Vital Statistics Act, SNWT 2011, c. 34, ss 1, 24(2); An Act to 
Amend the Vital Statistics Act, Bill 74, Yukon Legislative Assembly, 
ss 3-6, which comes into force on a day fixed by the Commissioner in 
Executive Council. 
78  The Vital Statistics Act, 2009 SS 2009, c V-7.21, s 2(1).  
79  See e.g. The Vital Statistics Act, 2009, ibid, ss 4, 19, 20(1); CLA, 
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unlike the registration of a birth, confers lifelong immutable 
status as a parent along with all the rights and obligations of 
parenthood. 80  The Children’s Law Reform Act in 
Saskatchewan, however, does not explicitly recognize different 
sources of parentage or the possibility of multiple parents, 
identifying the father and mother simply as “the mother” or 
“the father.”81 Because change has been piecemeal, the explicit 
acknowledgment of a co-parent under The Vital Statistics Act 
200982 has been made subject to inconsistent provisions within 
the CLA, 1997. 83  The same inconsistency exists between 
Manitoba’s statutes dealing with vital statistics and child 
status.84 In Nova Scotia, a court is empowered under the Vital 
Statistics Act to issue a declaratory order “with respect to the 
paternity of the child” and amend the birth registration 
accordingly85 but regulations pursuant to this Act permit the 
mother’s spouse, male or female, to register as a legal parent 
where the child is conceived with an anonymous sperm 
donor.86  
 
The use of the definite article preceding the words 
“father” and “mother” has been held in some jurisdictions to 
imply, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that there can 
only be one declared father or one mother.87 The Ontario Court 
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1997, supra note 2, s 29. 
80  See AA v BB, supra note 15 at para 14. 
81  CLA, 1997, supra note 2, s 2(1). 
82  Supra note 77. 
83  Supra note 2. 
84  See The Vital Statistics Act CCSM, c V-60, s 3 and The Family 
Maintenance Act CCSM, c F-20, ss 19-23 [Manitoba FMA]. 
85  Vital Statistics Act, RSNS 1989, c 494, s 11A(2), (3). 
86  Supra note 77. 
87  AA v BB, supra note 15 at para 18. See also PC v SL, 2005 SKQB 
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of Appeal held in AA v BB that the court could not declare a 
third person a parent under the legislation itself although they 
could rely on an inherent parens patriae jurisdiction to do so 
when in the best interests of the child.88 Quebec and Alberta 
have enacted detailed legislation that recognizes heterosexual 
or same sex partners in certain circumstances, but in both 
jurisdictions only two parents are contemplated.89 Indeed, in 
DWH v DJR, the Court of Appeal surmised in obiter that this 
express limitation could have the effect of excluding an 
intending biological father from parentage in Alberta where an 
intending non-biological father and a gestational mother are 
recognized.90  
Only British Columbia has legislation that allows for 
more than two parents where all parties agree in writing to be 
parents before assisted conception occurs. 91  Provided the 
consent of all parties is informed and voluntary, and thus the 
potential for conflict minimized, it is difficult to justify the 
denial of a parental role for a third party who can function as an 
additional source of financial and affective support for a 
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502, 262 DLR (4th) 157 (Wilkinson J accepted the Ontario Court of 
Appeal’s interpretation of similar language in the CLA, 1997, at paras 
8-9, 24); Buist v Greaves [1997] OJ No 2646 (Ont Gen Div). 
88  See below text accompanying notes 193-202. 
89  Droit de la famille 07528, 2007 QCCA 361, [2007] JQ No 1895, 
leave to appeal refused [2007] CSCR No 270 at para 55. See Family 
Law Act, SA 2003 c. F-4.5, s 9(7)(b) [Alberta FLA]. 
90  Where the gestational mother does not consent to an application by 
the intending biological father for a declaration, see DWH v DJR, 
2013 ABCA 240, 34 RFL (7th) 27 at para 69; Fiona Kelly, “One of 
These Families is Not Like the Others:  The Legal Response to Non-
Normative Queer Parenting in Canada” (2013) 51 Alta L Rev 1 
(Kelly describes this as “hardly a satisfactory outcome for non-
normative queer families” at para 44). 
91  BC FLA, s 27. 
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child.92 In these circumstances, recognition of three parents not 
only promotes equality of familial status but also familial 
security and the best interests of the child. In provinces such as 
Saskatchewan, however, parties would have to seek to rely on 
the court’s parens patriae jurisdiction in order to recognize 
three parents; failing that, there may only be one father and 
mother.93 
 
Social Parenthood and a Biological Lens 
 
Where only one mother and one father can be identified, which 
party will be defined as such is also unsettled in some 
jurisdictions. In Low v Low, a heterosexual couple planned a 
pregnancy together in which the wife was artificially 
inseminated by an anonymous donor.94 After the birth of the 
child, the wife no longer desired the husband’s involvement. 
Ferrier J found that the husband in this case could be declared 
the father since section 5(3) of the Children’s Law Reform Act 
provided that a court could make a declaratory order “where 
[it] finds on the balance of probabilities that the relationship of 
father and child has been established.” 95  Reference to the 
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92  Note that more than two individuals in the step-parent context are 
recognized as having support obligations and rights to claim custody 
and access even without regard to the possibility of conflict. See 
Chartier v Chartier [1999] 1 SCR 242; but see Fiona Kelly, “Nuclear 
Norms or Fluid Families? Incorporating Lesbian and Gay Parents and 
their Children into Canadian Family Law” (2004) 21 CJFL 133 at 171 
(the concern that a three parent model could be used to insert fathers 
in lesbian families).   
93  See Part IV, below, for discussion of parens patriae.  
94  Low v Low (1994) 114 DLR (4th) 709, 4 RFL (4th) 103 (OCJ), 
followed Zegota v Zegota-Rzegocinski [1995] 10 RFL (4th) 384, OJ 
No 204 (OCJ), varied on other grounds [1997] 31 RFL (4th) 446, OJ 
No 1360 (CA). 
95  Ontario CLRA, supra note 22, s 5(3). 
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“relationship of father and child” was broad enough to include 
a social father. Moreover, omission of the phrase “natural 
father” in section 5(3), used elsewhere in the statute, suggested 
that the relationship in question need not be biological. The 
judge refrained from finding that the husband was a presumed 
father by virtue of marriage to the mother, among other 
circumstances, as he would then have had to confront the 
question of whether such a presumption was rebutted in light of 
the acknowledged circumstances surrounding conception. 
Ferrier J also did not address the fact that the child might then 
have two fathers, perhaps because the sperm donor was 
anonymous and the biological father as such could never have 
become known. That the CLRA “favours” but does not define 
parentage solely on the basis of biology was affirmed by the 
Court of Appeal in AA v BB.96 
 
Subject to some variations, parentage legislation in 
Prince Edward Island, 97  Quebec, 98  Alberta, 99  Newfoundland 
and Labrador, 100  British Columbia, 101  the Northwest 
Territories,102 Nunavut,103  and the Yukon104  now specifically 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96  Supra note 15 at para 32. 
97  Child Status Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-6, ss 9(5), 9(6). 
98  Civil Code of Quebec, LRQ c-C-1991, Arts 538-42 [hereafter CCQ] 
(creating a presumption for married and civil union spouses). See 
Robert Leckey, “The Practices of Lesbian Mothers and Quebec’s 
Reforms” (2011) 23 CJWL 579. 
99  Alberta FLA, supra note 89, s 8.1(5). 
100  Children’s Law Act, RSNL 1990, c C-13, ss 12(3)-12(5) [CLA, 
RSNL]. 
101  BC FLA, supra note 20, ss 27, 29. 
102  Children’s Law Act, SNWT 1997, c 14, s 8.1. 
103  Consolidation of Children’s Law Act, SNWT 1997 c 14, s 8(01). 
104  Child and Family Services Act, RSY 2002, c 31, s 13. 
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provides either for recognition of a spouse in circumstances 
similar to Low v Low or a presumption of parentage in the 
spouse’s favour. In Newfoundland and Labrador and the 
Yukon, however, the legislation recognizes only male spouses 
and as such, is liable to being challenged as discrimination on 
the grounds of both sex and sexual orientation under section 15 
of the Charter.105  
 
As in Ontario, a court in New Brunswick may make a 
declaratory order where “the relationship of mother [or father] 
and child has been established.”106 However, in Saunders v 
MacMichael, Bastarache JA, as he then was, found that the 
“relationship of mother and child” referred to a biological and 
not a social relationship, and thereby disqualified a 
stepdaughter from an inheritance under the Devolution of 
Estates Act. 107  He noted that proof of such a maternal 
relationship would be required where “a child was taken from a 
mother at birth, where the mother is incapacitated and unable to 
testify, or where the mother is a refugee without parents or 
papers.”108  While ‘the relationship of mother and child’ is 
defined here exclusively in biological terms and not in terms of 
de facto care, the outcome could well differ where the mother-
child relationship is intended to be established before or at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105  Ibid s 13(2); CLA, RSNL, supra note 100. See Fraese v Alberta, 2005 
ABQB 889, 278 DLR (4th) 187 (a similar provision in Alberta was 
found to discriminate on the grounds of sex and sexual orientation 
contrary to section 15 of the Charter); MDR v Ontario, supra note 76 
(the birth registry provisions in Ontario were also found to 
discriminate against female same-sex parents).  
106  Family Services Act, SNB 1980, c F-2.2, s 100(2) [Family Serices 
Act, SNB] (“notwithstanding that there is no person recognized in law 
under section 103 to be the father” at s 100(4)). 
107  Saunders v MacMichael (1996), 173 NBR (2d) 49, [1996] NBJ No. 
39 (NBCA). 
108  Ibid NBJ at para 9.  See also, TTKO, SPO, GDK, 2011 ONSC 6601. 
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birth. Involvement in the circumstances that bring about the 
very existence of the child may reasonably imply a corollary 
intention to benefit such a child through intestacy or 
inheritance and to undertake all of the incidents of parentage. 
As indicated in AA v BB, similar language has been interpreted 
broadly to include intending lesbian mothers in Ontario with a 
view to promoting equality of familial status.109  
 
In Saskatchewan and Manitoba, there is no provision 
similar to section 5(3) of the CLRA and none of the statutory 
provisions refers to a “relationship of father and child.”110 In 
Manitoba, a “parent” is explicitly defined to mean a “biological 
parent or adoptive parent of a child and includes a person 
declared to be the parent of a child.”111 This language suggests 
that a declared parent must be either an actual or a likely (i.e. 
presumed) biological parent of a child. In both provinces, a 
declaration can only be made with respect to a finding that one 
is or is recognized to be “the father” or “the mother.”112 Both 
statutes also identify a number of circumstances that will give 
rise to presumptions of paternity, including cohabitation with 
the mother at the time of conception or birth of the child, 
having signed the birth registration form or having 
acknowledged that one is the father subsequent to birth. These 
circumstances could in theory generate presumptions that 
would result in either an intended or biological father being 
declared or “recognized in law” as “the father.”113 While such 
an outcome might suggest that parentage is a social or juridical 
construct and not a biological one, “the ordinary meaning of 
parentage” was interpreted in WJQM v AMA as signifying a 
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109  Supra note 15. 
110  Ibid. 
111  Manitoba FMA, supra note 84, ss 1, 19, 20. 
112  CLA, 1997, supra note 2, s 43(2); ibid, ss 19(1), 20(1). 
113  CLA, 1997, supra note 2, ss 43, 45(1). 
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biological relationship because it “relates to kindred (blood) 
ties.” 114  In PC v SL, Wilkinson J acknowledged that the 
presumptions of paternity are not explicitly grounded in 
biological fact; however, she noted that the presumption “made 
certain assumptions about ordinary human behavior in 
circumstances where direct proof was difficult…[i]n the days 
before DNA testing it was simply a method of facilitating proof 
at a time before science and technology intervened with more 
reliable standards.” 115  If “the factual question of 
progenitorship” is central,116 the presumptions reflect at most a 
likelihood of biological paternity based upon an opportunity to 
impregnate the mother or a subsequent acknowledgement of 
biological paternity, in the absence of proof to the contrary. 
According to these cases, the CLA 1997 contemplates an actual 
or likely biological connection, at least as a necessary condition 
of paternity, rather than a paternal relationship that is purely 
socially based. 
 
A man in the circumstances of Mr. Low could attempt 
to rely on a presumption of paternity in Saskatchewan if he had 
cohabited with the birth mother at the time of conception or 
birth of the child or had signed the birth registration form. 
Having no other provision to rely upon, however, he would 
face the possibility that any presumption in his favour would be 
rebutted by the circumstances of assisted conception itself, 
which would establish that he was not a biological father.117 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114  WJQM v AMA, 2011 SKQB 317 at paras 13, 18, 24.  However, while 
kindred relationships follow from a finding of parentage under the 
CLA, 1997, s 40(1), they do not define it exhaustively.  Compare s 
40(1), a “person is the child of his or her parents,” with s 40(3)(a) 
”kindred relationships are to be determined according to the 
relationships described in subsection (1).” 
115  Supra note 87 at para 20. 
116  Ibid at para 17.   
117  Wilkinson J. suggests as much in PC v SL, ibid, where in dealing with 
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While rebuttal of the presumption would seem to logically 
follow, under section 43(5) of the CLA 1997, a presumption of 
paternity may only be rebutted by proof that “the presumed 
father is not the father and a finding that a man is the father.”118 
In NMS v EBCS, Wilkinson J found that a presumed father 
could not simply rely on genetic tests excluding parentage but 
must also establish that someone else is in fact “the father.”119 
According to Madam Justice Wilkinson, the use of the 
conjunctive “and” in section 43(5) suggested that, in the 
absence of a conflicting presumption,120 the presumption of 
paternity on the part of the husband could not be displaced 
without identifying another man as the father. Unlike Ontario, 
or Manitoba for that matter, “a child cannot be declared 
fatherless in Saskatchewan.” 121  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the claim of a lesbian co-parent, she states, “if a male person 
cohabiting with the mother acknowledged that another man had 
impregnated her ... the male cohabitant would similarly be required to 
establish a parental relationship with the child by adoption, or to 
pursue other rights not conferring “status”, such as custody and 
access” at para 17. See WJQM v AMA, supra note 114, where a 
presumption in favour of a gestational mother under The Vital 
Statistics Act, supra note 77, s 4 (by virtue of her registration on the 
statement of live birth) was rebutted by the involvement of an 
anonymous egg donor. 
118  CLA, 1997, supra note 2, s 43(5) [emphasis added] 
119  NMS v EBCS, 2005 SKQB 299 at para 16, 2005 SJ No 434. 
120  A conflicting presumption would nullify the presumption. See e.g. 
CLA, 1997, supra note 2, s 57; Manitoba FMA supra note 84, s 20(5).  
121  Ibid at para 22. In Ontario, there is no such provision and a negative 
declaration can be made under the Courts of Justice Act, s 97, which 
allows a superior court to “make binding declarations of right, 
whether or not any consequential relief is or could be claimed, see 
Raft v Shortt [1986] 54 OR (2d) 768, 2 RFL (3d) 343 (OHC); JR v 
LH [2002] OJ No 3998 at para 19, 117 ACWS (3d) 276 (SCJ). In 
Manitoba, where the court finds on a balance of probabilities that a 
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We are thus left in an untenable position: the 
Saskatchewan Children’s Law Act has been interpreted as 
identifying actual or likely biological paternity but a presumed 
father cannot be displaced as the father unless another man is 
identified as such, even if there are means to establish that the 
presumed father is not the biological father. Such a constraint 
resembles the stringent standards required at common law to 
rebut a presumption of legitimacy 122  and supports Fiona 
Kelly’s thesis that parentage legislation is primarily concerned 
with “producing paternity”, along with private sources of 
support for children, rather than identifying genetic 
accuracy.123 In its application to cases similar to Low v Low, it 
also raises a question as to whether “a man”, i.e. a person other 
than the presumed father, must be capable of being specifically 
identified. Where the donor is unknown, would a court in effect 
be declaring a child fatherless if it found the presumption was 
rebutted? But if so, why should recognition of parentage for 
intending fathers/husbands depend upon whether the donor is 
known or unknown? This construction would give intending 
parents a powerful incentive to use anonymous over known 
donors, even where they believe that use of a known or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
man is or is not the father, or a mother is or is not the mother, it can 
make a declaratory order to that effect, Manitoba FMA supra, note 
84, ss 20(3), 19(2).   
122  This burden of proof, along with evidentiary rules that denied spouses 
a right to testify as to the illegitimacy of a child born during their 
marriage, was strongly indicative of a tendency to accept the most 
likely and available father. Roxanne Mykitiuk notes that “[b]y 
conflating the relationship between natural and social facts and 
construing them together as ‘natural,’ law reiterates and embeds these 
social constructions within the way we order our relations.” Roxanne 
Mykitiuk, “Beyond Conception: Legal Determinations of Filiation in 
the Context of Assisted Reproductive Technologies” (2001) 39 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 771 at 776, 781. 
123  Kelly, “Producing Paternity”, supra note 13 at 317, 325, 329, 330.   
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identity-release donor to establish the child’s genealogy might 
be in his or her best interests at some future point in time.  
 
Lesbian couples relying on assisted conception would 
also encounter difficulties in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and in 
those jurisdictions like the Yukon, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, where statutes specifically address assisted 
conception only in relation to male heterosexual partners.124 
First, as in PC v SL, the non-biological lesbian co-parent in 
Saskatchewan or Manitoba would face the argument that only 
one mother can be recognized under the CLA, 1997. 125 
Secondly, the presumptions only apply on their face to 
paternity, not maternity. Even if these presumptions were 
found to offend the Charter,126 the co-parent would face the 
same prospect of any presumption arising from his or her 
registration as a parent under vital statistics legislation being 
rebutted given the facts surrounding conception. Finally, if a 
child cannot be declared fatherless in Saskatchewan where a 
male applicant seeks to displace a presumption of paternity, 
would the same rationale be applied to preclude lesbian 
intending parents or single mothers from being declared the 
exclusive parents of a child?127 In all of these instances, there 
are not only concerns with a violation of gender equity but also 
a denial of equality of familial status and familial security. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124  See supra note 105. 
125  Supra, note 87. See CLA, 1997, supra note 2, ss 43(2)(b), 43(3) (both 
referencing “the mother”). See also Buist v Greaves, supra note 87 
(holding that reference to “the mother” means there can only be one). 
126  See below text accompanying notes 261-62.   
127  If section 43(5) was restricted to presumptions of paternity, a court 
could rely on s 11 of The Queen’s Bench Act, 1998 (1998 SS c Q-
1.01) which authorizes declarations in terms identical to s 97 of the 
Ontario Courts of Justice Act, (supra note 123). 
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This failure to address the relative claims of intending 
and genetic fathers or mothers, particularly where the donor 
was known, would also expose the child and all affected parties 
to instability where an intending parent changed his or her 
mind and decided to withdraw from the relationship during 
pregnancy or upon the birth of the child.128 The remaining 
parent could potentially lack a valid claim to child support 
where there either was no factual basis for a presumption or 
where the presumption was rebutted. Such an outcome would 
frustrate the expectations and reliance interests of the 
remaining parent and deprive the child of a source of support 
without any corresponding benefit, unless a known donor could 
be found liable or unless the intending parent could be found at 
some future point to stand in the place of a parent.129  
 
The Status of Gamete Donors 
 
Low v Low raised the question of the status of intending 
fathers, but what of the status of identifiable sperm or egg 
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128  See e.g. Jaycee B v John B 42 Cal App 4th 718 (1996), 49 Cal (2d) 
694. This case involved six contracting parties including the 
intending parents (both husband and wife were infertile), an egg and 
sperm donor and a gestational mother. While the gestational mother 
was pregnant, the intending parents separated and the intending father 
moved to a different state and refused to pay support after the child’s 
birth. He disputed liability on the basis of lack of parentage and none 
of the other possible parents wanted the responsibility with the 
exception of the intending mother. While the court found the 
intending father liable on the basis of the agreement, how would such 
a case be decided in Saskatchewan? 
129  In DWH v DJR, supra note 90, the male partner of the biological 
father of the child had, in an earlier proceeding, been awarded 
reasonable access to the child on the grounds that he had parented the 
child for 3 years and was in loco parentis to the child. In subsequent 
proceedings, he was granted a declaration of parentage when the 
court invoked its parens patriae jurisdiction as part of a Charter 
remedy. 
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donors where they do not want or the intending parents do not 
want them to have parental status after the birth of the child? 
Should they have rights to access and custody or obligations to 
pay support?130 
 
Provincial jurisdictions, again, have addressed these 
issues to varying degrees and with inconsistent outcomes. 
Interestingly, not as many provinces have moved to clarify the 
status of sperm donors as have legislated to give social parents 
standing, which is consistent with efforts to enlarge the net of 
individual financial responsibility and privatized support.131 
Those jurisdictions that have specifically legislated on the 
donation of sperm or ova through assisted conception, 
however, have allowed for the possibility that donors lack 
parental status. In Alberta, only the birth mother and the 
partner who consented to be a parent would be parents.132 In 
Quebec, a third party who contributes genetic material by way 
of assisted conception for a “parental project” (that is not his 
own) will not have the status of a parent.133 In Newfoundland 
and Labrador, the sperm donor is not a father if not married to 
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130  Two related questions are important but beyond the scope of this 
article, i.e. whether sperm donors should be treated differently than 
egg donors since egg donorship entails a more onerous and dangerous 
process that can have serious health risks (see Cameron, Gruben & 
Kelly, supra note 67 at 105) and what formalities, if any, should 
govern relinquishment of claims arising from a genetic tie in advance 
of birth (as opposed to after birth). 
131  Only 5/10 as opposed to 7/10. 
132  Alberta FLA, supra note 89, s 8.1(5). 
133  CCQ, supra note 98, Art 538.2. Three conditions must be met: “there 
must be a parental project formed by one or two persons, the sperm 
donor must not be a party to this project, and the donor must 
knowingly act as an assistant to the project that is not his own,” Droit 
de la famille 07528, supra note 89 at para 34; Droit de la famille 
111729 LB and EB v GN, 2011 QCCA 1180, [2011] QJ No 7881, 
leave to appeal refused [2011] SCCA No 444.    
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or cohabiting with the mother at the time of artificial 
insemination134 and in both Prince Edward Island and British 
Columbia, a donor of sperm or ovum is not a parent by reason 
of the donation alone.135 In the latter three jurisdictions, the 
parental status of a donor is lost only if the child is conceived 
through assisted conception rather than sexual intercourse; in 
Quebec, a donor by way of sexual intercourse has twelve 
months after the birth of the child to establish filiation, in 
which case the parental status of the spouse of the birth mother 
may be extinguished.136 In Droit de la famille – 111729 LB and 
EB v GN, Rochon J noted that the absence of formalities (such 
as a legal agreement and written consent) in Quebec poses 
“evidentiary difficulties, particularly when this juridical act is 
that of a woman alone and when the genetic material is 
provided by way of sexual intercourse.”137 
 
In jurisdictions that have not legislated in this regard, 
such as Saskatchewan, Ontario, Manitoba, and New 
Brunswick, either a sperm or egg donor could still be found to 
be a biological father or mother and declared as such over (or 
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134  CLA, RSNL, supra note 100, s 12(6). 
135  BC FLA, supra note 20, s 24(1); Child Status Act, supra note 97, s 
9(6). 
136  CCQ, supra note 98, Art 538.2, para 2. See Leckey, supra note 98 at 
588. Some states, e.g. Kansas, require that assisted conception occur 
under clinical or medical supervision.  
137  Supra note 133 at para 6 and see para 64.  In this case, the mother had 
died and her parents were unable to contradict the biological father’s 
claims.  He was found not to have expressly agreed to limit his role to 
that of a genetic contributor. The fact that he had been paid a 
“reward” for his contribution and did not want to and had not 
supported the child financially did not prevent recognition of his 
paternity, at para 62.  See also SG c LC [2004] RJQ 6915 (Sup Ct); 
Droit de la famille 07527 2007 QCCA 362 (intending lesbian 
partners were denied parentage in favour of biological fathers).  
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along with) the intending or commissioning parties. Donorship 
could then give rise to significant rights and obligations. 
Donors could be liable for child support, a long lasting and 
substantial financial obligation. As a result of the Court of 
Appeal decision in Schick v Woodrow, joint legal custody in 
Saskatchewan is presumptively in a child’s best interests when 
claimed by an interested and available non-cohabiting 
biological parent.138 The impact of an agreement with a known 
donor on his claim to access to the child after birth has only 
been dealt with on an interim basis in Ontario.139 In disputed 
cases, restricting parentage to only one mother and father could 
lead to the exclusion of the non-biological parent, absent 
reliance on parens patriae or a Charter claim.140 
 
On the face of the Saskatchewan CLA, 1997, it would 
seem that any agreement excluding parentage would be 
irrelevant to one’s status as a parent. As indicated, agreements 
respecting children in the context of sexual conception have 
been held not to bind a court.141 However, the assumption that 
a known sperm donor has the status of a parent has been 
questioned in some cases. In PC v SL, Wilkinson J appeared to 
suggest that biological paternity is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition of parentage.142 She noted that parental 
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138  2012 SKCA 1 at para 25, 385 Sask R 153, rev’g 2009 SKQB 167, 
[2009] SJ No 366. 
139  See DeBlois v Lavigne, 2012 ONSC 3949 (access by the donor was 
denied but the case was thereafter settled out of court).  
140  Bird, supra note 13 at 281 and Boyd, “Gendering,” supra note 3 at 
77. 
141  Wright v Zaver, [2002] 59 OR (3d) 26, 211 DLR (4th) 260 (CA) at 
paras 27-28. See also Doe v Alberta, 2007 ABCA 50 at para 26, 404 
AR 153, leave to appeal refused [2007] SCCA No 211 in the context 
of step-parent status. 
142  Supra note 87. See also Buschow v Jors, supra note 51, 
acknowledging that sperm donorship may justify curtailment of child 
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status “is not simply an issue of biological connection” and 
cited with approval the US Supreme Court in Lehr v Robertson, 
which held that the “importance of the familial relationship to 
the individuals involved, and to the society, stems from the 
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily 
association…as well as from the fact of blood relationship.”143 
Based on this commentary, there is some scope within which to 
argue that a mere sperm or egg donor should not be assigned 
parentage. 
 
In Johnson-Steeves v Lee, the Alberta Court of Appeal 
also gave substantial weight to the finding of the trial judge that 
the father had not agreed to be a mere sperm donor prior to 
birth in affirming his entitlement to an access order. 144 
According to the Court, “[t]he respondent is not an anonymous 
faceless figure who has donated sperm by whatever means and 
shown no other interest in the child…the respondent did not 
agree that he would have no role to play in his child’s life.”145 
In finding the intended role of the biological father relevant to 
the issue of access (normally governed only by the best 
interests of the child), the appellate court’s position suggests 
that the existence of an agreement to exclude parental rights 
and obligations to donors before birth might also be relevant to 
a finding of parental status.146 Kelly, however, notes that courts 
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support obligations, at para 7. 
143  436 US 248 at 260, 103 Sup Ct 2985 at 2992, cited at para 21.   
144  [1997] AJ No 1057, 209 AR 292 (CA) at para 18. 
145  Ibid at para 16. 
146  But see Stevenson v Egeland [1995] AJ No 1296 (QB) where an 
agreement between the mother and a friend that he was to impregnate 
her but not pay child support did not prevent an action against him by 
the social welfare agency that provided social assistance to the 
mother.  An analogy to a sperm bank was rejected because the donor 
lacked anonymity and there was no public policy in favour of non-
support. 
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tend to be less willing to sever the rights of biological fathers 
where women have conceived outside of traditional 
heterosexual relationships. As well, she indicates that courts 
are more willing to allow sperm donors to renege on prior 
agreements and seek a role in parenting where the intending 
parents are lesbian as opposed to heterosexual or where the 
intending parent is single. 147  Resistance may be tempered, 
however, where discretion is highly restricted through statutory 
provisions and agreements to relinquish status are very 
explicit.148 
 
As previously discussed, Garrison argues that single 
women should not be able to parent autonomously of biological 
fathers by choice or agreement because women who conceive 
sexually have no such choice and “there is no obvious reason 
why paternity laws should mandate different results when 
women conceive using AID and when women conceive 
sexually.”149 Contrary to Garrison’s assertions, however, the 
“mechanics of conception” may be highly relevant to 
“relational realities.”150 Holding men responsible in instances 
of casual sex may, at least in theory, promote an equal sense of 
responsibility for the potential consequences of sexual 
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147  Kelly, “Producing Paternity,” supra note 13, (regarding lesbian 
mothers at 340-49 and citing resistance to severance of a donor’s 
legal rights in the case of a single mother at 337). See Caulfield v 
Wong 2007 ABQB 732. 
148  Kelly, “Equal Families”, supra note 13, citing Droit de la famille 
07528, supra note 133 as a successful lesbian case and noting that 
Quebec and BC are the only jurisdictions to recognize the possibility 
of a single parent family created through assisted conception, at para 
46. 
149  Supra note 6 at 903 (there is “no logical basis for a one-parent policy 
applicable only to single AID users” at 910 where AID connotes 
artificial insemination donation). 
150  Ibid at 903. 
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intercourse. 151  By contrast, assisted conception is typically 
highly planned and deliberate, especially when executed in a 
clinical setting, and usually indicative of a very high level of 
responsibility on the part of both donors and intended parents. 
Moreover, the frustration or upending of stable expectations 
and reliance interests can generate extreme stress and conflict 
which, given the intimate interdependence of parent and child, 
can harm all affected parties. Allowing heterosexual couples 
but not lesbian or single mothers to block paternity claims by 
sperm donors also reinforces a hierarchical ordering of family 
forms.152 
 
Lack of provision for the status of sperm or egg donors 
thus constitutes another gap that has problematic implications 
for parents and children in some jurisdictions. At present, the 
only sure way to protect against breach of a settled 
arrangement is to use anonymous donors. In this event, the 
child will have no knowledge of his or her biological father or 
mother and no ability to have any contact with him or her. 
Although disputed, in Pratten v BC, Adair J found some 
evidence that such an outcome could be harmful for some 
children.153  There is also evidence that lesbian couples are 
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151  Alternatively, Sally Sheldon argues that biological fathers should not 
be held liable for child support in clear cases of misrepresentation by 
mothers of their use of birth control, “Unwilling Fathers and 
Abortion: Terminating Men’s Child Support Obligations?” (2003) 66 
Modern Law Rev 175. Others might argue that sexual intercourse 
creates an inherent risk of conception. 
152  See supra, text accompanying notes 42-66. 
153  2011 BCSC 656 at paras 85-89, rev’d 2012 BCCA 480 on the 
question of Charter breach, leave to appeal refused [2013] SCCA No 
36. But see Lori Chambers & Heather Hillsburg, “Desperately 
Seeking Daddy:  A Critique of Pratten v. BC (AG)” (2013) 28 Can J 
L Soc 229 (argue that Adair J. failed to distinguish between harm 
caused by secrecy and anonymity, with only the former necessarily 
reinforcing stigma, and that evidence of harm as a result of 
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more likely than heterosexual couples to use known sperm 
donors, preferably gay men, or donors under identity-release 
conditions, so that children are able to access knowledge about 
their genetic father or allow for his involvement at some future 
point.154 Cameron, Gruben & Kelly suggest that the failure to 
provide certainty through legislation could end up harming 
children by driving intended parents away from known 
donors.155 
 
Given the neoliberal emphasis on privatized support 
over the last few decades, it is interesting that judges and 
legislators have to such a significant extent excused gamete 
donors from liability. Appleton questions why “sperm donors 
need not pay the tax that sexually conceived unmarried fathers 
must pay” and suggests that this reveals the “limits of the 
privatization of dependency as family law’s theoretical 
foundation” in favor of the regulation of sex as a core value of 
contemporary family law in the United States. 156  But her 
analysis fails to address why governments are interested in 
regulating sexual conduct and what objectives or interests are 
thereby served. Kelly’s analysis suggests that the reluctance to 
hold sperm donors liable may be more pronounced in the 
context of more conventional two-parent heterosexual 
households.157 The policy can also be indirectly linked to a 
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anonymity has been prone to self-selection bias at 136-37). 
154  See Leckey, supra note 98 at 590; Kelly, “(Re)forming Parenthood,” 
supra note 68 at 190; Droit de la famille – 111729, supra note 133 
(where the Quebec appellate court considered the biological father’s 
access to the child a neutral fact since some involvement may have 
been desired short of recognition of paternity at para 60). 
155  Supra note 67 at 101, 107, 117-18, 118, 130, 148. 
156  Supra note 44 at 369 and 376. 
157  See supra text accompanying note 147. 
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privatization agenda given its emphasis on the allocation of 
individual responsibility through private ordering.158 
 
The Status of Gestational Mothers 
 
Further difficulties arise in identifying mothers since 
motherhood can now be fragmented into genetic, gestational 
and intending motherhood. Even fewer jurisdictions have 
specifically addressed the implications of gestational 
arrangements than is the case with gamete donation. In Alberta 
and British Columbia, the gestational mother will be 
recognized as the mother unless she consents to loss of status 
after the birth of the child. 159  In both provinces, to have 
parental status as intending parents, the child must be 
conceived by assisted conception and in British Columbia, the 
intending parents must also have assumed care of the child 
after birth. In Prince Edward Island, by contrast, there is no 
provision for consent and a gestational mother is expressly 
deemed to be the mother whether or not she is the genetic 
mother.160  Because the Civil Code also does not recognize 
surrogacy arrangements, the gestational mother is also 
invariably recognized as the mother in Quebec and the non-
biological co-parent must seek status as an adoptive parent.161  
 
All of these jurisdictions, as well as the proposed 
Uniform Child Status Act162, recognize the significance of the 
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158  In other contexts, see Ronen Shamir, “The age of responsibilization: 
on market-embedded morality” (2008) 37 Economy & Society 1. 
159  Alberta FLA, supra note 89, s 8.2(6), 9(2); BC FLA, supra note 20, s 
29(3). 
160  Child Status Act, supra note 97, s 9(7). 
161  See CCQ, supra note 98, Art 541 and see Adoption – 09184 In the 
Matter of: X Born […] 2008, A, Applicant-Adopter and B and C, Mis 
en cause 2009 QCCQ 9058, [2009] RJQ 2694 (CQ). 
162  Supra note 4. 
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gestational mother’s role and, in sharp contrast to the treatment 
of sperm donors, subject the removal of her status at the very 
least to her consent after birth. The differential treatment of 
sperm donors and gestational mothers responds to real 
differences in the experience of each in the process of 
procreation. It not only ensures that there is a legal parent who 
can provide consent for medical treatment for the child but also 
allows for the possibility that the gestational mother may have 
changed her mind through and as a result of gestation.163 
Where the gestational mother does not consent to either the 
parentage of the social parent or adoption, a social parent may 
presumably acquire the status of a step-parent with more 
limited rights and responsibilities. 
 
In other provinces and the territories, surrogacy 
arrangements are not addressed by statute. Virtually all cases in 
these jurisdictions have proceeded by the consent of all the 
affected parties and declaratory orders have been issued. All 
such cases appear to recognize some degree of discretion in 
granting orders but factors influencing the exercise of 
discretion have varied and different approaches by the courts 
will raise concerns with gender equity and again generate 
familial instability and uncertainty in the event of conflict. 
 
In a recent Saskatchewan case, WJQM v AMA, a child 
was conceived using the egg of an anonymous donor that was 
fertilized by one of the two intending fathers.164 The fertilized 
egg was then implanted in the womb of another woman who 
delivered the child. The Vital Statistics Act 2009 defines a 
father as a “person who acknowledges himself to be the 
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163  On information deficiencies at the time of contracting, see e.g. Molly 
J Walker Wilson, “Precommitment in Free-Market Procreation: 
Surrogacy, Commissioned Adoption, and Limits on Human Decision 
Making Capacity” (2005) 31 J Legis 329. 
164  Supra note 114. 
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biological father” and mother as the woman “from whom a 
child is delivered.”165 Thus the child was registered under the 
names of the genetic father and gestational mother. Under 
section 29, however, the registration of live birth could be 
amended if a court made a determination of “parentage” with 
respect to a child.166  
 
Upon such an application, Ryan-Froslie J held that 
“parentage” in the CLA, 1997 referred to lineage and that “the 
mother of a child” in provisions authorizing declarations as to 
parentage referred to: 
 
…a child’s biological mother. Such an 
interpretation is consistent with the ordinary 
view of parentage which relates to kindred 
(blood) ties. It is also consistent with the 
provisions of Part VI of The Children’s Law Act, 
1997 relating to a declaration of parentage with 
respect to a child’s father for which the Court 
may order genetic testing. It would be 
inconsistent to view the biological father as a 
parent and not the biological mother.167 
 
Given the involvement of an anonymous egg donor, 
the presumption in favour of the gestational mother by virtue of 
her registration on the statement of live birth was rebutted. 
Ryan-Froslie J noted that she was “also satisfied neither the 
applicants nor Mary [the gestational mother] ever intended that 
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165  Supra note 77, s 2(1). 
166  Supra note 77. 
167  Supra note 114 at para 18. See also Garrison, supra note 6 for a 
gender-blind approach: “To rely on gestation as the determinant of 
motherhood and genetics as the determinant of fatherhood would 
undesirably introduce a gender-specific element in the determination 
of parentage” at 917. 
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Mary would assume any parental rights or obligations with 
respect to Sarah [the child]. As such, a declaration that Mary is 
not Sarah’s mother is warranted.”168 
 
The finding that “mother” referred to a genetic mother 
rather than the birth or gestational mother not only departs 
from the definition under vital statistics legislation but also the 
conventional definition of a mother in the civil, if not the 
common law, traditions. 169  Where maternity is fragmented, 
both genetic and gestational mothers participate in the 
biological process of producing a child and the gestational 
mother, by any measure, is far more intimately involved in that 
process for a much longer period of time.170 By basing her 
definition of motherhood on the experience of a biological 
father and using that as the norm for comparison, Ryan-Froslie 
J ignored obvious and salient differences between the 
reproductive experiences of mothers and fathers. Since only 
one mother can be identified by statute as “the mother”,171 the 
identification of the genetic mother as such would appear to bar 
future claims by gestational mothers who do not consent to the 
loss of maternal status after birth.  
 
Because the egg donor was anonymous, the Court did 
not have to deal with a potential claim between the egg donor 
and the intending non-biological (in this case, male) parent. An 
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168  Ibid at para 25. 
169  For a discussion of legal concepts of maternity based on gestation and 
birth see Cindy Baldassi, Babies or blastocysts, parents or 
progenitors: Embryo Donation and the concept of Adoption 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2006) at 80-90.  
170  Marina S et al, “Sharing Motherhood: Biological Lesbian Co-
Mothers, a New IVF Indication” (2010) 25 Human Reproduction 938 
at 939 and see, Anne Donchin, “Toward a Gender-Sensitive Assisted 
Reproduction Policy” (2009) 23:1 Bioethics 28 at 36-38.  
171  CLA, 1997, supra note 2, s 2. 
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exclusive statutory emphasis on biological definitions of 
parenthood, however, implies that a court could not identify a 
female social parent as the mother where the egg donor is 
known, whether or not there is a contest between the parties. 
Where the donor is unknown, WJQM v AMA also highlights a 
contradiction in the statutory treatment of mothers and fathers. 
The child in this case was effectively declared motherless on 
the basis that the judge had the authority under section 43(2)(b) 
of the CLA, 1997 to find that “a woman is or is not in law the 
mother of the child.” When it comes to fathers, however, a 
child cannot be declared fatherless.172 Why it should be more 
important to recognize fathers than mothers was left 
unaddressed.  
 
In JAW v JEW, a New Brunswick court declared a 
heterosexual couple who were the genetic parents to be the 
parents of a child born to a gestational mother, who was the 
sister of the female applicant and who had consented to the 
declaration.173 As in WJQM v AMA, Walsh J defined biological 
in genetic terms and found that the provisions of the relevant 
Family Services Act “obviously contemplate declarations for 
biological (genetic) parents.”174 There was “no good reason in 
law or public policy” not to issue a declaration, but rather 
“compelling reasons” to do so in light of the significant 
benefits that would flow from an immutable recognition of 
parental-child status.175 Walsh J did note, however, that the 
extent to which the Court’s jurisdiction to make parentage 
declarations was “confined to biological (“genetic”) 
relationships” was not at issue.176  
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172  See NMS v EBCS, supra note 119. 
173  W (JA) v W (JE), 2010 NBQB 414, 373 NBR (2d) 211, [2010] NBJ 
No 390 (QB). 
174  Ibid at para 16. 
175  Ibid at para 22. 
176  Ibid at para 18. See also Family Services Act, SNB supra note 106, s 
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In Ontario and British Columbia, (prior to the recent 
enactment of the Family Law Act), courts relied on a general 
power to grant equitable declaratory relief as to legal status in 
dealing with surrogacy arrangements. In Rypkema v BC, a 
genetic mother was declared the mother where this was 
consistent with the best interests of the child and the intentions 
and consent of all parties.177 In BAN v JH, Metzger J issued a 
declaratory order in favour of a genetic father and an intending 
mother with the consent of the gestational mother and a known 
egg donor, in order to avoid the expense, delay and uncertainty 
of adoption proceedings.178 In Ontario, judges relied on their 
parens patriae jurisdiction in KGD v CAP, in ordering that a 
child be registered under the name of the biological father as 
the sole parent, without mention of the anonymous egg donor 
and gestational mother179 and in MD v LL, Nelson J went 
further to issue a declaration that the gestational mother was 
not a mother, having found that certainty and stability of 
parenthood was in the best interests of the child180.  
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96(1) (“[w]here the court finds on a balance of probabilities that the 
relationship of mother and child has been established, the court may 
make a declaratory order to that effect,” s 100(2)). 
177  Rypkema v BC, 2003 BCSC 1784, 233 DLR (4th) 760. See Ontario 
CLRA, supra note 22 (“[w]here the court finds on balance of 
probabilities that the relationship of mother and child has been 
established, the court may make declaratory order to that effect” at s 
4(3)). 
178  BAN v JH, 2008 BCSC 808, 294 DLR (4th) 564. 
179  KGD v CAP [2004] OJ No 3508 (SCJ). The Department of Vital 
Statistics in this case was also found responsible for half of the 
applicant’s legal costs given that the legislative gap had necessitated 
the court application. 
180  MD v LL [2008] OJ No 907, 90 OR (3d) 127 (relying on Ontario 
CLRA supra note 22, s 4 and Courts of Justice Act, supra note 121, s 
97). See JR v LH, supra note 121. 
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In all of the above cases, the affected parties had 
consented to the parentage ordered. A declaration has been 
refused in such circumstances in only one reported case in 
Manitoba, where the pre-birth declaration sought by the 
intending parents was found not to be authorized by statute.181 
In JR v LH, Kiteley J noted that if a conflict between the 
gestational and genetic mothers had existed, she would have 
had to consider whether more than one mother could be 
declared.182 In the only reported case in Canada involving a 
contest with the gestational/genetic mother, the intending 
parents who had care of the child since birth were given interim 
custody but the case did not proceed to trial.183 The paucity of 
litigation may reflect a high incidence of satisfactory outcomes 
but it may also be attributed to financial cost or a perceived low 
prospect of success.184 Busby and Vun note that most of the 
empirical evidence to date suggests that gestational mothers are 
generally satisfied with their role in the process and detach 
early in the pregnancy.185 Nonetheless, there are cases where 
gestational mothers have bonded or attached during pregnancy, 
experienced distress and refused to relinquish the child, 
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181  JC v Manitoba, 2000 MBQB 173, [2000] MJ No 482. Although 
Manitoba’s Family Maintenance Act allows for pre-birth declarations 
of paternity, it is silent regarding maternity. The Court found that 
legislature intended that the vital statistics records should reflect who 
actually gave birth to the child. The Department of Vital Statistics 
was not opposed to declaration of parentage as requested by the 
applicants so long as it came after birth. 
182  JR v LH, supra note 121 at paras 17-18. 
183  HLW and THW v JCT and JT, 2005 BCSC 1679, [2005] BCJ No 
2616. See also AJ v MC (1992), 286 California Reporter 369 (genetic 
parents obtained a declaration over the gestational mother). 
184  Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, “Revisiting The Handmaid’s Tale: 
Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research on Surrogate Mothers” 
(2010) 26 Can J Fam L 13 at 38. 
185  Ibid at 67-76. 
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contrary to the expectations of all parties.186 Special provision 
for gestational mothers responds to gender equity by 
recognizing the significant role played by them in the life of the 
newborn child, the effort and risks of gestation and the inability 
to predict accurately the consequences of conception, including 




The cases discussed in this Part represent attempts to deal with 
the failure on the part of most legislatures to grapple 
comprehensively with the unique challenges posed by 
reproductive technologies. By statute, multiple parents are 
recognized only in British Columbia; while intending parents 
are recognized in eight jurisdictions, in the Yukon, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, only male spouses qualify. 
Outcomes remain highly uncertain in New Brunswick, 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan and in the latter jurisdiction also 
appear subject to an overriding requirement that a child not be 
declared fatherless. In five jurisdictions, known gamete donors 
do not acquire parental status purely by reason of their 
donation but their status in others is unclear, with the use of 
anonymous donors being the only sure way of ensuring familial 
security. Gestational mothers are recognized as mothers in four 
jurisdictions but in many others their status, in the event of a 
contest, would also be uncertain. In Saskatchewan, maternity 
has to date been interpreted solely in genetic terms which may 
thereby prevent recognition of parentage by a gestational 
mother but also an intending social mother, even where the 
genetic or gestational mother consented to a loss of parentage.  
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186  Ibid at 15-16. See most famously, the case of Mary Beth Whitehead 
in In re Baby M, 537 Atlantic Reporter (2d) 1227 (NJ 1988). 
187  Supra note 163. 
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In addition to generating familial insecurity and 
inequality in these varied contexts, inconsistencies in outcomes 
across jurisdictions lead to forum shopping.188 Below, I assess 
the extent to which reliance on the doctrine of parens patriae 
can mitigate harmful outcomes and facilitate the well being of 
children in the absence of legislative reform.  
 
LEGISLATIVE GAPS AND THE DOCTRINE OF 
PARENS PATRIAE 
 
A superior court has an inherent jurisdiction to act in the best 
interests of vulnerable parties, including children, where a 
legislature has failed to do so. The scope of this jurisdiction is 
undefined and potentially broad.189 In early cases involving 
children born to unmarried parents, superior courts relied on 
their equitable jurisdiction to grant fathers’ rights to custody 
and access and did so without inquiring into the Legislature’s 
intentions.190 Recent cases, however, suggest that although the 
child need not be at immediate risk,191 intervention must both 
be necessary to protect the child’s welfare192 and the failure on 
the part of the Legislature to act must not have been 
deliberate.193 While reliance on the parens patriae jurisdiction 
of superior courts has provided a way of dealing with claims 
related to reproductive technologies in the absence of 
legislative reform, it is not a panacea.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
188  Busby & Vun, supra note 184 at 90-91. 
189  E (Mrs) v Eve, [1986] 2 SCR 388 at 426, 31 DLR (4th) 1. 
190  See Boyd et al., Autonomous Motherhood?, supra note 12, ch 2. 
191  DWH v DJR, supra note 90 at para 61. 
192  Dovigi v Razi, 2012 ONCA 361 at para 21, 110 OR (3d) 593, leave to 
appeal refused [2012] SCCA No 348. 
193  AA v BB, supra note 15. 
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In AA v BB, the Ontario Court of Appeal drew on 
Beson v Newfoundland194 in finding a legislative gap that could 
be remedied through the exercise of the court’s inherent parens 
patriae jurisdiction. 195  The Court declared the biological 
mother and father as well as the lesbian co-partner of the 
mother parents of a child even though the legislation in 
question explicitly recognized only two parents. According to 
the Court, when the current CLRA was enacted in 1978 in 
Ontario, the unique challenges posed by reproductive 
technologies were generally unknown and unforeseen. 196 
Although reliance on parens patriae generated an outcome 
inconsistent with the express and unambiguous language of the 
statute, the statute itself was based on a limited premise and 
was never intended to deal with assisted conception.  
 
As discussed, there are several potential gaps in 
conventional parentage legislation across Canada. Statutes in 
several jurisdictions do not address the possibility of multiple 
parents and even more jurisdictions fail to address the relative 
roles and responsibilities of sperm and egg donors, gestational 
mothers and intending parents. Were these gaps intended? It 
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194  Beson v Newfoundland, [1982] 2 SCR 716, 1982 CanLII 32 (the 
statute was deficient because no right of appeal was provided for the 
pre-adoptive parent where allegations of sexual abuse were 
unfounded and it was in the child’s best interests to stay in that 
home). See also MD v LL, supra note 180 (because Ontario’s Vital 
Statistics Act did not contemplate the possibility of conception 
through the implantation of ovum, the Court could rely on parens 
patriae to declare that the gestational mother was not the mother and 
remove ambiguity as to who was responsible for the child); MDR v 
Ontario, supra note 76 (parens patriae was not available because the 
Legislature was found to intend other avenues of recourse [through 
CLRA declarations or adoption] in cases involving non-biological 
parents).  
195  AA v BB, supra note 15 at para 30. 
196  Ibid at para 21. 
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seemed important to the Appeal Court in AA v BB to determine 
“whether the CLRA was intended to be a complete code and, in 
particular, whether it was intended to confine declarations of 
parentage to biological or genetic relationships.”197 In the latter 
event, “it would be difficult to find that there is a legislative 
gap, at least as concerns persons with no genetic or biological 
link to the child.”198 Moreover, according to some cases, the 
gap must be filled in a manner consistent with the legislative 
intent or the scheme of the Act as a whole.199 Although the 
court in AA v BB found that the CLRA “favours biological 
parents”, it “does not define parentage solely on the basis of 
biology.” 200  By contrast, whether the legislation in other 
provinces, particularly Saskatchewan and Manitoba, is based 
on a biological norm is arguably not as clear.  
 
However, the Ontario court went on to find that a 
legislative gap could exist even if the CLRA was intended to 
limit declarations to biological parents provided the issue of 
reproductive technologies and assisted conception had not been 
contemplated or foreseen by the legislature. In 1978, when 
Ontario moved to abolish illegitimacy, developments in 
reproductive technologies were “beyond the vision” of the 
Legislature.201 “There is nothing in the legislative history of the 
CLRA to suggest that the Legislature made a deliberate policy 
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197  Ibid at para 32. 
198  Ibid at para 31. 
199  See e.g. T(KG) v D(P), 2005 BCSC 1659 at para 67, 21 RFL (6th) 
183 (to allow an adoption by a same sex ex-partner where the birth 
mother did not consent would be contrary to the scheme of the Act); 
O’Driscoll v McLeod (1986) 10 BCLR (2d) 108, 1986 CanLII 735 
(BCSC) (the clear intent of the legislature cannot be overridden 
where there is no legislative gap). 
200  Supra note 15 at para 32. 
201  Ibid at para 34. 
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choice to exclude the children of lesbian mothers from the 
advantages of equality of status accorded to other children 
under the Act.”202 
 
Obviously, parens patriae cannot generally be relied 
upon in provinces that have recently legislated in relation to 
assisted conception. 203  In other jurisdictions, it must be 
established that the failure to address assisted conception was 
not contemplated at the time existing legislation was 
enacted.204 The Saskatchewan CLA, for example, was amended 
to abolish the status of illegitimacy in 1990, 12 years after the 
Ontario Legislature. 205  Reproductive technologies were not 
common but were in use. Indeed, the Saskatchewan Law 
Reform Commission had, as early as 1981, proposed specific 
legislation dealing with the legal position of all parties relying 
on artificial insemination.206 As well, failure to legislate on 
reproductive technologies constitutes a substantial, rather than 
a minor, gap in parentage law.207  Nonetheless, there is no 
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202  Ibid at para 38. 
203  See e.g.  DWH v DJR, 2011 ABQB 608 at para 141, 7 RFL (7th) 84. 
204  See JU v Alberta, 2001 ABCA 125 at para 7, 281 AR 396 (such an 
oversight must not be presumed and must be clearly established,). For 
findings of no legislative gap where the legislature’s intention was 
found to be contrary to the position sought by the applicant, see WAM 
v BC [1985] BCJ No 2060, 47 RFL (2d) 173; Re DT [1992] NSJ No 
289 (CA); RL v CAS Niagara (2002) 34 RFL (5th) 44, 167 OAC 105. 
205  The Act was amended in 1998 only to allow for a French translation; 
no substantive changes were made at that time. The Adoption Act 
was, however, amended in 1998 to allow same sex couples to adopt. 
206  Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan, Tentative Proposals for 
a Human Artificial Insemination Act (Sakatoon: Law Foundation of 
Saskatchewan, 1981) online: Law Reform Commission of 
Saskatchewan <http://lawreformcommission.sk.ca/Human_Artificial_ 
Insemination_Act_Tentative_Proposals.pdf>  
207  See Rebus v McLellan [1992] NWTJ No 183 (de Weerdt J. found (at 
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evidence in debates preceding the passage of the CLA in 1990 
that the Legislature specifically contemplated the existence of 
these technologies or made a deliberate choice as to their 
impact in enacting the Act. Like the Ontario Court of Appeal, 
courts in other provinces may also not be prepared to assign “a 
discriminatory intent [to the Legislature] in a statute designed 
to treat all children equally” and may find it necessary to 
protect the best interests of a child in such situations.208 As 
Nicholas Bala and Robert Leckey note, in the family law 
context Charter values may indirectly influence superior courts 




para 17) that the failure to provide for retroactive support was “much 
more than a mere gap in the legislation in the present instance; there 
is an unbridgeable void” that could not be filled through the exercise 
of parens patriae). But see Hunt v Smolis-Hunt, 2001 ABCA 229, 
paras 21-34, 286 AR 248, (the Court ordered retroactive support with 
parens patriae powers where the Divorce Act was silent on the issue 
and there was a “rational, functional connection” between retroactive 
support and the objects of the Act) 
208  AA v BB, supra note 15 at para 38. See DWH v DJR, supra note 90 
(parens patriae was used to grant a declaration to a gay intending 
parent in the context of a Charter remedy). Some cases have also held 
that the exercise of parens patriae is not dependent on finding a 
legislative gap if it is the only way to meet the paramount objective of 
the legislation: Frontenac Children’s Aid Society v JD [2009] OJ No 
3760, 180 ACWS (3d) 423 at para 14; CR v Children’s Aid Society of 
Hamilton [2004] OJ No 3301, 70 OR (3d) 618 (SCJ) at paras 29, 48, 
50. 
209  Nicholas Bala & Robert Leckey, “Family Law and the Charter’s First 
30 Years: An Impact Delayed, Deep, and Declining but Lasting” 
(2013) 32 CFLQ 21 at 24-25. See also Kelly, “Equal Parents”, supra 
note 13, (argues that the value of equal status should inform the 
interpretation of the best interests of the child in cases involving 
lesbian and single mothers who conceive through assisted 
conception). See DWH v DJR, supra note 90. 
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Assuming a legislative gap can be established, each 
individual case will then be decided in terms of the best 
interests of the child in question. 210  Although others may 
incidentally benefit, the parens patriae jurisdiction is to be 
exercised for the benefit of the protected person, not for the 
benefit of others.211 This approach can provide the flexibility to 
recognize gamete donors, gestational mothers and intending 
parents where and when it accords with the child’s welfare, 
taking into account agreements and disagreements between 
parties, as well as other relevant factors. Retaining discretion in 
this manner is arguably a better option than interpreting a 
statute narrowly or in ways that can generate unwelcome 
results for future parties, as may follow in the wake of WJQM v 
AMA. 
 
However, deciding these issues on a case by case basis 
may still leave parties without general rules to guide their 
conduct and shape their expectations. Where parens patriae 
has been relied upon, judges have generally not undertaken an 
extensive examination of the child’s best interests but have 
concluded, rather summarily, that the latter will be served by 
certainty and stability.212 In virtually all such cases, the relevant 
parties have consented or had long established relationships 
with the children. In MDR v Ontario, Rivard J held that 
because the exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction was limited 
to an individual remedy, the Court could not consider the best 
interests of children not before it nor bind others whose claims 
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210  See MDR v Ontario, supra note 76 at paras 105-110. 
211  E (Mrs) v Eve, supra note 189 at para 77; DWH v. DJR, supra note 90 
at para 62. 
212  E.g. MD v LL, supra note 180 at para 67 (where all parties 
consented); KGD v CAP, supra note 179 (where the biological father 
applied for registration, the egg donor was unknown, and the 
gestational mother consented).   
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had to be determined on an individual basis.213 Thus, what is in 
the best interests of each individual child could potentially 
depend upon a host of particular factors including the existence 
of conflict and the relative parental capacity and economic 
status of the parties. This highly discretionary approach will 
not resolve inconsistencies between jurisdictions nor promote 
family security and reduce conflict for children generally.214  
 
Moreover, because parens patriae looks solely to a 
determination of a child’s best interests, outcomes need not be 
grounded in nor necessarily reflect the principle of equal 
familial status. In MDR v Ontario, Rivard J noted that in 
deciding cases on a best interests standard, judges “may fail to 
consider other important legislative objectives.”215 Outcomes 
that depend solely upon the best interests of a child have the 
potential to render significant interests of prospective primary 
parents, including an interest in gender equity, irrelevant, and 
to ignore or understate the critical intersection of parental 
interests with the well-being of the child. Admittedly, the 
Ontario appellate court in AA v BB did interpret its parens 
patriae powers in light of equality of familial status and more 
recently, in dealing with legislation pre-dating the current 
Family Law Act in Alberta, the Court of Appeal concluded that 
“it is not in a child's best interests for her parent to be denied 
the same benefits that flow automatically to heterosexual 
parents.”216 Although the Alberta Court appeared to grasp the 
relational quality of the interests at stake in finding that 
“children benefit when the law recognizes the reality of their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
213  Supra note 76 at paras 105-110. 
214  See also Nicole LaViolette, “Dad, Mom – and Mom:  The Ontario 
Court of Appeal’s Decision in AA v. BB” (2007) 86:3 Can Bar Rev 
665 cited by Kelly, Equal Families, supra note 13 (it is “unable to fill 
these gaps in any coherent, consistent and policy-driven way” at 5). 
215  MDR v Ontario, supra note 76 at para 84. 
216  DWH v DJR, supra note 90 at para 50. 
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family situations, even when that reality falls outside the 
norm”,217 such outcomes are not guaranteed in all cases. 
 
If the exercise of a court’s parens patriae jurisdiction 
is inadequate, can a more adequate response be compelled 
through a Charter challenge? Challenges to the status of 
illegitimacy under the Charter were influential in finally 
abolishing discriminatory provisions in relation to child 
maintenance and inheritance in some jurisdictions. In the next 
section, I briefly sketch the constitutional dimensions of a 
principle of equality of familial status under section 15 of the 
Charter and identify the potential barriers to success that exist 
in the context of assisted conception.  
 
SECTION 15 OF THE CHARTER 
 
The general issue to be assessed in the context of assisted 
conception is whether the failure of some jurisdictions to 
recognize an intending, social parent as a parent either in lieu 
of or in addition to the genetic or gestational parents constitutes 
an infringement of section 15 the Charter.218 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
217   Ibid at para 60. 
218  Section 7 of the Charter may also be relevant since a failure to 
recognize parental status may constitute a threat to “liberty” or to 
“security of the person.” The psychological security of children born 
into conflictual situations and of parents whose plans are frustrated is 
arguably threatened in the context of assisted conception. In Pratten v 
BC, supra note 153, neither the Superior Court nor the Court of 
Appeal upheld the claim that a “right to know one’s past” was a right 
or interest protected under s 7. At stake in the context of assisted 
conception more generally is not mere knowledge of the identity of a 
donor but the benefits that follow from recognition of a more secure 
and immediate parental relationship. Nonetheless, it is unclear 
whether an applicant could meet the standard enunciated in Pratten of 
a right that is “so ‘fundamental’ that it is entitled to independent 
constitutionally protected status under the Charter” per SD Frankel at 
para 50. Additionally, as the Court of Appeal noted at para 46, more 
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Section 15 guarantees the equal protection and benefit 
of the law without discrimination on both enumerated and 
analogous grounds. 219  Arguably, children and parents in 
heterosexual biologically-related families have rules that 
directly apply to and govern their situation but parents using 
and children born of assisted conception in some jurisdictions 
are deprived of these benefits and exposed to arbitrary and 
uncertain outcomes. Since Kapp,220 and Withler,221 two primary 
questions are to be addressed under section 15: does the law 
create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous 
ground, and does the distinction create a disadvantage by 
perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping? More recently, a 
majority of the Court made clear in Quebec v A that prejudice 
and stereotyping are not “discrete elements of the test” that 
need to be proven by a plaintiff but rather potential indicia of 
disadvantage more generally due to membership in an 
enumerated or analogous group.222 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
established s 7 jurisprudence suggests that the state must also actively 
deprive the person of a right to security contrary to an identified 
principle of fundamental justice. Challenges to illegitimacy did not 
rely on s 7 and the question of whether the lack of legislative 
recognition in the context of assisted conception violates s 7, 
including whether it constitutes a deprivation as well as a breach of 
fundamental justice, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
219  Charter, supra note 1 (“[e]very individual is equal before and under 
the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of 
the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability”, s 15(1)). 
220  R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 483. 
221  Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 SCR 
396. 
222  Quebec v A, 2013 SCC 5 at paras 172, 185-86, 325, 354 DLR (4th) 
191. 
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In relation to the first issue, potential grounds of 
discrimination in the assisted conception context that may be 
relied upon, either singly or in combination, include sex, sexual 
orientation, marital or family status and manner of conception. 
In Corbiere v Canada, the Supreme Court identified an 
analogous ground as a “personal characteristic that is 
immutable or changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal 
identity.” 223  Sexual orientation 224  and marital status 225  have 
clearly been identified as analogous grounds under section 15, 
but family status and manner of conception have yet to be 
considered by the Supreme Court. Laws in relation to 
illegitimacy were frequently challenged on the basis of 
discrimination against “unmarried females”226 and in a few 
cases, single fathers, on the grounds of both sex and marital 
status.227 Children were able to rely on the circumstances of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
223  Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian & Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 
SCR 203 at para 13, 173 DLR (4th) 1, McLachlin & Bastarache JJ (as 
McLachlin was then).   
224  Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513, 124 DLR (4th) 609; Vriend v 
Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493, 156 DLR (4th) 385; Williams v Haugen, 
[1988] SJ No 732, 55 DLR (4th) 720 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC 
refused [1989] 1 SCR ix. 
225  Miron v Trudel, [1995] 2 SCR 418, 124 DLR (4th) 693; Nova Scotia 
(Attorney General) v Walsh, 2002 SCC 83, [2002] 4 SCR 325; 
Quebec v A, supra note 224; Jackson v Zaruba 2013 BCCA 81, 
[2013] 28 RFL (7th) 289. 
226  Williams v Haugen, supra note 224; Bomboir v Harlow, [1987] 5 
WWR 55, [1987] SJ No 304; Gorzen v Litz, [1988] 4 WWR 763, 50 
DLR (4th) 758 (SKCA); LK v TWL, [1988] BCJ No 3101, 31 BCLR 
(2d) 41; Panko v Vandesype, [1993] SJ No 132, 101 DLR (4th) 726. 
See also Friesen v Gregory, [1986] SJ No 662, 55 Sask R 245, 
Dickson J (justifying the restriction of CUPA legislation under s 
15(2) as “single mothers who choose to raise their children are 
disadvantaged” at para 14). 
227  See e.g. NM v BC (Superintendent of Family and Child Services, 
(1986) 34 DLR (4th) 488, [1987] 3 WWR 176 (BCSC) (that consent 
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their birth in several instances as well, as this was seen as a 
matter in which they were “entirely helpless.” 228 Children born 
‘out of wedlock’ were also easily characterized as a discrete 
and insular minority.229  
 
More recently, the British Columbia Superior Court in 
Pratten v BC found that manner of conception was an 
analogous ground in an action by a person conceived through 
assisted conception who sought disclosure of records 
identifying sperm donors. 230  Arguably, the loss of secure 
parentage in assisted conception, like the loss of citizenship 
because of the gender of one’s parent or a loss of benefits 
linked to a mother’s marital status,231 is a loss suffered directly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
of birth father to adoption not required found to be a violation of s 
15). Contra Re DT (1992) 91 DLR (4th) 230, 111 NSR (2d) 430 
(NSSC), rev’d on other grounds (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 289, 113 NSR 
(2d) 74; and CES v Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, 
(1988) 64 OR (2d) 311, 49 DLR (4th) 469; AG of Nova Scotia v 
Phillips (1986) 34 DLR (4th) 633, 26 CRR 332 (NSCA) and 
Reference Re Family Benefits Act (1986) 75 NSR (2d) 338, 26 CRR 
336 (NSCA) (denial of family benefits to single fathers violates s 15 
and is struck down) and Shewchuk v Ricard [1986] BCJ No 335 (CA) 
(that fathers could not seek child support from mothers under 
paternity legislation violated s 15 but was saved under s 1). 
228  Williams v Haugen, supra note 226 at 733 per Sherstobitoff JA; 
Christante v Schmitz, [1990] 4 WWR 744, 83 Sask R 60 (QB); 
Surette v Harris Estate, (1989) 91 NSR (2d) 418, 16 ACWS (3d) 256 
(TD); Milne v Alberta (Attorney General) [1990] 5 WWR 650, 74 
CLR (4th) 403 (QB) and NM, ibid per Huddart LJSC at 500 (DLR). 
229  Milne, supra note 228. 
230  Supra note 153 at para 224.  This issue was conceded on appeal and 
not dealt with by the Court of Appeal. 
231  See Benner v Canada [1997] 1 SCR 358, 143 DLR (4th) 577 at paras 
83-86 (“the guarantees of s 15 regarding race, skin colour, or ethnic 
background could otherwise be rendered nugatory by consistently 
making the parent of the actual target the focus of discrimination 
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by the child and as such, is not a case of discrimination by 
association (where a person is relying on the identity of another 
who has wholly suffered the disadvantage).232 
 
Gruben and Gilbert, however, suggest that family 
status would provide a more solid basis than manner of 
conception upon which to launch a case involving assisted 
conception because it is more apt to be seen as a distinction 
that perpetuates prejudice or stereotyping or that identifies a 
group subject to historical discrimination. 233  Manner of 
conception, as evident in Marsha Garrison’s endorsement of 
identical outcomes in relation to both sexual and technological 
conception, may also generate a formal equality analysis. 
Elaine Craig has similarly argued that reliance on family status 
rather than sexual orientation is more likely to avoid a formal 
equality approach to section 15 and to promote recognition of 
familial relationships that deviate from the heterosexual 
norm.234 However, manner of conception need not rely upon a 
sameness model if the failure to take account of salient 
differences related to the manner of conception itself is found 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
rather than the target him- or herself” at para 86). See also MDR v 
Ontario, supra note 76 at para 197. 
232  In Wynberg v Ontario (2006) 82 OR (3d) 561, 369 DLR (4th) 435 at 
para 206, the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected a claim of 
discrimination on the grounds of family status by parents of autistic 
children, holding that the parents were relying not on their own 
identity but rather on the identity or characteristics of their children,. 
Arguably, this characterization ignores the unique relational quality 
of parental status and the unavoidable suffering of parents whose 
children cannot secure an appropriate education. 
233  Vanessa Gruben & Daphne Gilbert, “Donor Unknown: Assessing the 
Section 15 Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring” (2011) 27 Can J 
Fam L 247 at 265-67. 
234  “Family as Status in Doe v Canada: Constituting Family under 
Section 15 of the Charter” (2007) 20 National Journal of 
Constitutional Law 197. 
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to be discriminatory. The existence, for example, of agreements 
and the extent of involvement or degree to which interests of 
the parties are affected by the particular manner of conception 
itself should be considered relevant.235 Manner of conception 
may also be more broadly conceived of in terms of 
circumstances of birth, a ground which was relied on by 
children considered ‘illegitimate’ in the past. 
 
Nonetheless, family status may better reflect the 
socially imputed sense of inferiority or deficiency and shame 
that has historically been used as a basis for stereotyping 
families that deviate from the conventional two-parent 
heterosexual model. Family status may also better capture the 
relational quality of the interests at issue and the negative 
impact of non-recognition on children as well as other family 
members. Moreover, it can encompass a range of varied 
circumstances. The Federal Court of Appeal in Thibaudeau v R 
identified the status of a separated custodial parent as an 
incident or component of family status, and noted “the fact that 
family status or some similar expression figures as a prohibited 
ground of discrimination in most human rights statutes also 
serves to confirm its analogous nature to the grounds 
enumerated in the Charter.”236  Most human rights statutes 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of family status but do not 
define it. Legislation in Saskatchewan and Ontario define 
family status as the “status of being in a parent and child 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
235  See supra, text accompanying notes 73-75, 149-52, and see cases 
suggesting that equal treatment does not require identical treatment, 
infra, note 264. 
236  [1994] 2 FC 189, 114 CLR (4th) 261 per Hugesson JA at para 45, 
rev’d [1995] 2 SCR 627, 124 DLR (4th) 449 without discussion of 
marital or family status by the majority.  McLachlin J (as she then 
was) in dissent found that separated or divorced custodial parenthood 
itself constituted an analogous ground of discrimination which was 
broadly immutable and defined a group historically subject to 
disadvantage. 
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relationship”,237 which begs the question of how a parent-child 
relationship itself should be defined. 238  Courts have also 
referenced single motherhood as an established source of 
prejudice and discrimination, although this has usually been 
identified as discrimination on the grounds of sex and marital 
status rather than family status.239 
 
Non-biological parenthood may also qualify as an 
incident of family status but the claims of adoptive parents 
have not met with uniform success under the Charter. While 
adoptive parenthood was identified as an analogous ground at 
trial in Schafer v Canada, the appellate court questioned, 
though it did not determine, whether adoptive motherhood 
constituted an immutable characteristic or identified a discrete 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
237  The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, SS 1979, c S-24.1, s 
2(1)(h.1) (which includes step-parents, adoptive parents and persons 
standing in the place of a parent); Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c 
H.19, s 10(1); Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25 (Alberta 
defines family status more narrowly as “the status of being related to 
another person by blood, marriage or adoption” s 44(1)(f)). 
238  In Pilette c R, 2009 FCA 367, 319 DLR (4th) 369, the denial of a tax 
credit to parents supporting dependent children over 18 appeared to 
qualify as a distinction based on family status but family status itself 
was not seen to comprise a homogeneous vulnerable group and 
therefore presumably did not qualify as an analogous ground. The 
lack of co-residence with a child one financially supports was not 
seen as a distinction based on family status and co-residence was not 
identified as an analogous ground in Fannon v Canada (Revenue 
Agency), 2012 FC 876, 219 ACWS (3d) 227. 
239  See e.g. Falkiner v Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social 
Services, Income Maintenance) [2002] 59 OR (3d) 481, 212 DLR 
(4th) 633 (CA) (relying on sex, marital status and receipt of social 
assistance); R v Rehberg (1994) 111 DLR (4th) 336, 127 NSR (2d) 
331 NSSC (single mothers); Dartmouth/Halifax Regional Housing 
Authority v Sparks (1993), 119 NSR (2d) 91, 101 DLR (4th) 224 
(NSCA) (sex, race and income) and Droit de la famille – 111526, 
2011 QCCS 2662, [2011] RJQ 907 (divorced single mothers). 
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minority that has suffered stereotyping or prejudice. 240 
Biological parents have in fact been found to be victims of 
discrimination where greater benefits were provided to 
adoptive parents.241 Biology has also been given weight in the 
allocation of parental rights such as custody and access to 
children242 and biological fatherhood was given constitutional 
status in Trociuk v BC in relation to the naming of children.243 
Indeed, the biological aspect of parenthood raises the question 
of whether family status could be relied on to strengthen claims 
to access or custody by sperm donors.244 
 
The legal and social history of adoption does suggest 
that non-biological parenthood identifies a family form that has 
disadvantaged family members and subjected them historically 
to stereotyping and prejudice. At common law, adoption was 
not a recognized form of parentage. As Elizabeth Bartholet 
suggests, adoptive families have traditionally been perceived in 
western cultures as unnatural and inevitably troubled,245 and 
stereotypical attitudes about the presumed characteristics of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
240  [1997] 35 OR (3d) 1, 149 DLR (4th) 705, leave to appeal to SCC 
refused [1997] SCCA No 516. Accord Tomasson v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2007 FCA 265, [2008] 2 FCR 176; Re Centennial College 
of Applied Art and Technology & OPSEU (1998) 69 LAC (4th) 105, 
[1998] OLAA No 1051. All of these cases challenge the denial of 
maternity benefits to adoptive parents. 
241  See e.g. Schachter v Canada, (1988) 52 DLR (4th) 525, 11 ACWS 
(3d) 161, violation on the ground of parental status conceded on 
appeal [1992] 2 SCR 679, 93 DLR (4th) 1. 
242  In this context, as courts have at times recognized, the weight given 
to biological ties can deflect claims made by others who enjoy race 
and/or class privilege relative to the biological parent.   
243  Trociuk v BC, supra note 76. 
244  Craig, supra note 234 raises this possibility at 219. 
245  Supra note 27. 
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individual adoptive families persist even as adoption is more 
common. These attitudes affect both parents and children 
although courts appear to accept more readily the historically 
disadvantaged status of adopted children rather than adoptive 
parents.246 As Gruben and Gilbert note, there are differences 
between adopted children and children created through assisted 
conception: in the latter case, at least one of the parents is often 
a genetic parent and the birth is arranged in advance. 247 
However, both signify a departure in some measure from 
conventional biological parentage and in both cases, most 
children would have been, but for its abolition, subject to the 
taint of illegitimacy. The assumption that biology is an 
exclusive or necessary condition of parentage also gives rise in 
the context of assisted conception to a culture of secrecy and 
shame that can expose children to psychological harm. 
 
Beyond the issue of analogous grounds, there are also 
questions as to whether the laws in question “create” 
distinctions and if so, whether these distinctions perpetuate 
disadvantage. The laws related to illegitimacy, which were 
challenged under the Charter, expressly distinguished between 
children of married or unmarried parents. Most were also 
clearly detrimental to the status and rights of children of 
unmarried parents by imposing restrictive conditions on the 
ability of mothers to obtain support from putative fathers that 
were not applied to children of married parents 248  or by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
246  See e.g. Schafer, supra note 240 at paras 26-27, “[t]here can be no 
doubt, as well, that adopted children have suffered legal 
disadvantage, but the advantages denied adoptive parents, save for the 
Act itself, are neither impressive nor persuasive” at para 50. See also 
Strong v Marshall Estate 2009 NSCA 25, 309 DLR (4th) 459 at para 
31 and the BC Court of Appeal’s finding in Pratten, supra note 153, 
that adoptive children were protected under s 15(2) of the Charter as 
a historically disadvantaged group. 
247  Supra note 233 at 261-62. 
248  Williams v Haugen, supra note 224; PAD v LG (1988) 89 NSR (2d) 
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preventing children from inheriting on intestacy.249 In all these 
cases, children were not similarly treated and the resolution of 
inequality entailed similar or identical treatment. Justifications 
under section 1, such as the orderly distribution of property in 
the case of intestacy statutes or evidentiary burdens, were 
typically dismissed without substantial discussion.250 
 
In the context of assisted reproduction, by contrast, the 
laws at issue include both explicit and implicit exclusions that 
fail to take account of material differences between sexual and 
assisted conception. First, there is the exclusion of social 
intending parents from the status of parents. If parentage 
legislation is interpreted as identifying only biological parents 
as legal parents, as may well be the case in Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba, the law has thereby created a distinction that denies 
intending social parents the legal status of parentage. The 
failure to extend protection of the law to a particular group can 
be challenged under section 15; whether the legislation 
excludes explicitly or by way of omission is immaterial so long 
as the exclusion is shown to have a disproportionate impact on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7, NSJ No 600 (NS Fam Ct); Murley v Hudye, (1994) 150 AR 67, 
112 DLR (4th) 220 (QB); LK v TWL, [1988] BCJ No 3101, 31 BCLR 
(2d) 41 (Prov Ct); JALK v JR, (1996) 193 AR 26, 141 DLR (4th) 25 
(CA) (challenges to time limitations on applications for maintenance). 
Milne v Alberta, supra note 228 (termination of a right to 
maintenance on marriage of the mother). Panko v Vandesype, supra 
note 226 (termination of a right to maintance where contrary to a 
private agreement). Gorzen v Litz, supra note 226 Bomboir v Harlow, 
supra note 226; Murley v Hudgye, ibid; LK v TWL, ibid (challenges to 
the requirement of corroboration of a mother’s testimony).  
Christante v Schmitz, supra note 228 (other procedural limitations). 
249  Surette v Harris Estate, supra note 228; Tighe v McGillivray Estate, 
(1994) 112 DLR (4th) 201, 127 NSR (2d) 313 (CA). 
250  See e.g. Milne, supra note 228; Panko, supra note 226. Claims that 
putative fathers would be disadvantaged in disproving paternity were 
found baseless, especially in light of blood or genetic testing. 
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a protected group.251  In this context, recognition of secure 
parentage is a benefit provided by law to children of 
heterosexual biological parents, but not to children conceived 
through the use of assisted conception. 
 
Assuming the basis for the discrimination (whether 
directly or indirectly on the grounds of family or marital status, 
sex, sexual orientation or manner of conception) is recognized 
under section 15, social intending parents cannot acquire the 
immutable, lifelong status of parenthood in relation to children 
they have helped to conceive with the intention of being a 
parent, short of adoption.252 While an adoption can be sought, 
this requires a post-birth legal proceeding and generally, the 
consent of biological parents. Unlike adoption, the intending 
parents in assisted conception are involved from the outset in 
the planning for the child. Commitments are made in advance 
of child’s birth and relied on by all parties with the view to 
generating a stable environment for the rearing and 
development of the child. Arguably, this exclusion does 
perpetuate disadvantage by imposing a differential burden on 
families that do not conform to a heterosexual biological 
norm.253 
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251  Vriend v Alberta, supra note 224 per Cory JJ, at paras 56, 61, 76, 84. 
252  Most of the intending parents who have relied on a Charter challenge 
were lesbian or gay and able to claim discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation. See e.g. MDR v Ontario, supra note 76 (non-
biological heterosexual intending partners were found able to “pass” 
as biological parents and register their particulars on the Statement of 
Live Birth without government scrutiny, unlike non-biological same 
sex intending partners); Fraese v Alberta, supra note 105 (a lesbian 
intending partner challenged a co-parent provision limited to male 
spouses); DWH v DJR, supra note 90 (a gay intending parent 
challenged presumptions that were limited to male spouses of birth 
mothers). See AA v BB, supra note 15, (obiter referencing a 
discriminatory intention at para 38). 
253  Arguably, the law distinguishes on its face and thereby constitutes 
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Moreover, this differential burden is based upon and 
can perpetuate both prejudice and stereotyping that fails to 
correspond to a claimant’s actual characteristics or 
circumstances.  In Quebec v A, Abella J defined prejudice as 
the “holding of pejorative attitudes based on strongly held 
views about the appropriate capacities and limits of individuals 
or groups of which they are a member.”254 Historically, the 
families affected by the type of exclusion in question, namely 
same sex couples, single parent families and heterosexual non-
biological families, were all subject to widely held beliefs that 
they provided inferior or defective settings in which to raise 
children. As Lebel J for the minority noted, even apparently 
neutral rules may perpetuate prejudice by establishing a 
“hierarchy of worth” and “[treating] certain individuals like 
second-class citizens whose aspirations are not equally 
deserving of consideration.” 255  Stereotyping, according to 
Abella J, “like prejudice, [is] a disadvantaging attitude, but one 
that attributes characteristics to members of a group regardless 
of their actual capacities.”256  While some empirical studies 
suggest that child outcomes differ on average according to 
family form, outcomes in individual cases, as discussed, clearly 
depend upon a range of variables that include stability, 
parenting ability or capacity, social or economic supports, and 
an absence of parental conflict.257  Casting all families that 
deviate from the heterosexual, biological nuclear norm in a 
pejorative light is, in other words, a classic illustration of 
negative stereotyping that both abstracts from the “actual need, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
direct discrimination.  If it were seen as adverse effect discrimination, 
having a disproportionately negative impact on a group, the onus on 
the claimant at the second stage would be higher, see Withler, supra 
note 221, at para 64 per McLachlin CJ and Abella J. 
254  Quebec v A, supra note 222 at para 326. 
255  Ibid at paras 197-98 
256  Ibid at para 326. 
257  See supra, text accompanying notes 54-62. 
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capacity or circumstances of the claimant”258  and “has the 
effect of perpetuating arbitrary disadvantage … because of his 
or her [group] membership.”259 
 
Beyond the exclusion of intending parents, other 
sources of controversy include the explicit limitation of 
parenthood in some statutes to one mother and father. Allowing 
for only one of each gender would directly exclude same sex 
couples whose families will, by definition, involve not one but 
two mothers or two fathers.260 The fact that presumptions apply 
only to heterosexual males may also constitute discrimination 
on grounds of sex, sexual orientation, and family status.  
Wilkinson J in PC v SL cast doubt in obiter on the validity of 
such a claim by a lesbian intending parent,261 but in DWH v 
DJR, a similar provision in the former Alberta Act was found to 
discriminate against male individuals who were not in a 
heterosexual relationship with the birth mother by not granting 
them a presumption of paternity.262  
 
The Charter implications are decidedly more uncertain 
when the claim entails the relinquishment of parenthood or the 
recognition of an intending parent (genetic or otherwise) in lieu 
of a gamete donor or gestational mother. Does the failure to 
exclude a sperm donor from the status of a parent constitute a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
258  Quebec v A, supra note 222 per Lebel J at para 203. 
259  Ibid per Abella J at para 331. 
260  For discrimination on such grounds in relation to registry statutes, see 
Fraess v Alberta, supra note 105; MDR v Ontario, supra note 76; Gill 
v Murray, supra note 76.  The fact that heterosexual couples may also 
be affected by this requirement under parentage statutes could be 
immaterial since finding a comparator group is no longer required for 
a s 15 claim, see Withler, supra note 221. 
261  PC v SL, supra note 87 at paras 17, 20. 
262  Supra note 90. 
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violation of section 15? This omission affects all individuals 
using assisted conception, including heterosexual intending 
parents, but it can disproportionately impact same sex couples 
and single parents, as they do not benefit from the statutory 
presumptions under parentage statutes.263 Assuming that this 
omission creates a discriminatory distinction between 
biological and non-biological parents (by virtue of family or 
marital status, the manner of conception, sexual orientation, 
and/or sex), a court would also have to grapple with whether it 
perpetuates disadvantage. While the omission may increase 
potential sources of financial support for a child, it may also, 
more importantly, compromise familial security and introduce 
instability and conflict into a child’s life. The omission also 
again reflects a refusal to recognize a distinctive familial form 
based on a stereotyping of all same sex or single parent 
families as deficient. 
 
The failure to address the status of gestational mothers 
in some jurisdictions raises similar issues but also the question 
of whether the potential exclusion of parentage status, as found 
in WJQM v AMA, discriminates against gestational mothers (on 
the grounds of sex and manner of conception) by failing to 
recognize differences in reproduction between men and 
women. According to Andrews v Law Society of BC, “identical 
treatment may frequently produce serious inequality.”264 Parity 
between genetic mothers and fathers should thus not be the 




263  MDR v Ontario, supra note 76 at para 195. Lesbian couples are also 
more likely than heterosexual couples to use known donors – and thus 
the issue is more likely to arise in that context, Kelly, “(Re)forming 
Parenthood,” supra note 68 at 190. 
264  [1989] 1 SCR 143 at para 26, SCJ No 6, McIntyre J; see Brooks v 
Canada Safeway Ltd [1989] 1 SCR 1219, SCJ No 42. 
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Constitutional claims of a section 15 violation in the 
context of assisted conception are clearly much more complex 
than the challenges that were advanced in relation to 
illegitimacy, even though discrimination in both contexts, as I 
have argued, reinforces the same kind of prejudice. The net 
effect of virtually all of the Charter challenges to illegitimacy 
was to recognize children of unmarried parents as legitimate 
and to extend parentage to and expand the private support 
obligations of unmarried biological fathers. 265 By contrast, the 
claims being advanced in the context of assisted conception 
would extend parentage beyond the two-parent heterosexual 
biological norm and vary the number of parents to more or less 
than two in some cases. While such claims may be 
controversial, at the same time, the claims fit well with the 
individualistic premises of the Charter in that they call 
attention to the fact that the well-being of children varies 
according to the individual circumstances of their households. 
Legal recognition of parentage in the context of assisted 
conception would acknowledge that family members should 
not be stigmatized and arbitrarily excluded at law based on 
stereotypical assumptions related to family structure. The fact 
that assisted conception arises from individual plans and 
agreements may also resonate as exercises in individual choice 
and autonomy, values that have been considered and embraced 
by some judges of the Supreme Court under both sections 15 






265  Judy Fudge, “The Privatization of the Costs of Social Reproduction: 
Some Recent Charter Cases” (1989) 3 Can J Women & L 246. 
266  See e.g. Walsh, supra note 225 and Quebec v A, supra note 222 per 
LeBel J. (within a s 15 analysis) and McLachlin CJ (under s 1 for the 
majority). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Whether legislatures will be sufficiently moved by the prospect 
of a Charter claim to provide equality of familial status where 
children are conceived through assisted conception is an open 
question. A number of other factors influential in the abolition 
of illegitimacy are not as pressing or salient in the context of 
such a potential reform. Whereas increasing numbers of 
children were born outside of marriage into common law 
unions from the 1970s onward, the number of children born 
using assisted conception is not dramatically surging. While 
many of the children were being reared by parents in 
households functionally similar to heterosexual marital homes, 
thereby legitimizing their status, assisted conception potentially 
affects a diverse range of family forms, involving not only 
heterosexual marital unions but social and multiple parentage, 
same sex relationships, and single parenthood. Equalizing the 
status of children of unmarried parents also ultimately placed 
more emphasis on the obligations and rights of biological 
fathers, which was consistent with the neoliberal privatization 
agenda of the 1980s and 90s and the increasing emphasis on 
both genetic ties and fatherhood in relation to child welfare 
upon separation or divorce. By contrast, women in lesbian 
relationships and single mothers directly challenge a child’s 
need for fathers or genetic parents and to some degree, the 
privatization agenda. Thus, the question of what serves the 
well-being of children generally is still contested in the context 
of assisted conception. Finally, while illegitimacy presented a 
clear violation of formal equality, the resolution of claims 
arising from assisted conception is complex, and legislative 
efforts have varied across jurisdictions. Even in the face of the 
multiple pressures that favoured the abolition of illegitimacy, 
there was a significant delay in legislative reforms in 
jurisdictions like Saskatchewan, with one jurisdiction, Nova 
Scotia, still retaining the concept of legitimacy.  
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Notwithstanding these differences, governments have 
an obligation to provide certainty and stability for all children 
and parents, even those children born by way of 
unconventional arrangements. The present state of the law on 
assisted conception within and across jurisdictions, however, 
gives rise to numerous inconsistencies, inequalities and ad hoc 
outcomes. Just as resistance to abolishing illegitimacy reflected 
a reluctance to encourage non-marital sex and single 
parenthood and a failure to recognize equality of familial 
status, legislative gaps in assisted conception may also reflect a 
reluctance to accept single parenthood or same sex families, 
even at the cost of destabilizing heterosexual families 
established through assisted conception. Any attempt, however, 
to distinguish single parents or same sex parents from two-
parent heterosexual families should raise Charter concerns.  As 
with the old story of illegitimacy, ensuring the security and 
well being of all children is ultimately linked to a need to 
accept both more diverse familial forms and a greater measure 
of social responsibility for children.  
 
